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Abstract: This study explores the adaptations made to European Union (EU) directives during their 
legal implementation (i.e. transposition) in member states, so-called customization. To explain why 
transposition actors customize, and whether these patterns are contingent to the regulatory logic of 
policy fields, I combine tenets of rational choice and sociological institutionalism. Analysing 13 
directives in the Netherlands from both de- and re-regulatory fields of policy, no clear differences in 
the extent of customization can be discerned between areas. Through the use of multilevel ordinal 
and linear regressions, I find that more discretion and a higher number of veto players increase the 
likelihood of customization. Other explanations, such as the preferences of ministers or European 
Commission monitoring, do not display significant effects. Although these findings diverge from 
previous work, I conclude that the scope and structure of the data are only sufficient to nuance these 
earlier findings.     
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Copy paste or tailor-made? 
The customization of EU directives across Dutch policy sectors 
 
“Henry Ford’s customers could have a car in any colour, as long as it was black” (Fitch-Roy, 2016: 
586). Akin to Ford’s black cars, research on the legal implementation of European Union (EU) 
directives by member states has regularly observed a wide range of transposition outcomes, as long 
as it was painted in (the shades of1) one ‘colour’ only: (non-)compliance (e.g. Héritier et al., 2001; 
Falkner et al., 2005; Di Lucia & Kronsell, 2010; König & Mäder, 2013). Studying transposition (i.e. legal 
implementation) in terms of compliance, however, is too narrow, as member states implement 
directives in diverse ways, likely going beyond or staying behind on the requirements formulated in 
Brussels (Thomann & Sager, 2017a; Bondarouk & Liefferink, 2017). For instance, Fink and Ruffing 
(2017) find that Germany ‘over-implemented’ the directive on energy grids. Likewise, Cerna (2013) 
observes how the Blue Card Initiative, which grants visa to high-skilled immigrants, was transposed 
only partly by (amongst others) Austria, while the text of the same directive was almost ‘copied out’ 
as precisely as possible by Germany. Not only do outcomes such as these remain partly unobserved 
by sticking to the classification of compliance or non-compliance, such a perspective is also 
inadequate to explain these cases (Thomann, 2015).  
 
Recently another ‘colour’ has been added to the transposition palette, which seeks to account for 
precisely such issues. Coined as ‘customization’ (Thomann & Zhelyazkova, 2017), it concerns the 
changes of EU rules in their density (i.e. number of policy measures) and restrictiveness (i.e. 
intensity) during transposition. Despite the fact that customization is analytically broader, much 
remains unknown about its extent and causes. Even though it has received some scholarly attention 
in recent years, explanatory analyses have yet remained limited to either case studies (Bugdahn, 
2005; Cerna, 2013; Falkner et al., 2005; Falkner & Treib, 2008; Fink & Ruffing, 2017; Liefferink et al., 
2011; Logmani et al., 2017; Martinsen & Vasev, 2016; Padgett, 2003; Steunenberg, 2007) or a 
qualitative medium-range analysis (Thomann, 2015). Other academics have examined only one 
aspect potentially affecting customization, such as discretion (Dörrenbacher & Mastenbroek, 2017) 
                                                             
1 The shades here being timeliness (e.g. Thomson et al., 2007), substantive conformability (e.g. König & Mäder, 
2013), convergence and gold-plating of transposition (Jans et al., 2009). 
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or role conceptions (Mastenbroek, 2017). Moreover, scholars have focused mainly on possible 
differences between member states (e.g. Liefferink et al., 2011), while research so far suggests that 
degrees of customization primarily vary across policy areas (Thomann & Zhelyazkova, 2017). These 
gaps in transposition scholarship leave important issues to be explored: why are some provisions 
more customized than others? Are some policy areas more conducive to customization, and if so, for 
what reasons? Providing answers to such queries is all the more relevant in light of lingering debates 
on the shift of competences to Brussels and the loss of legitimacy of the European project (see 
Zimmermann & Dür, 2016): when member states customize directives they “modify EU law and 
regain control” (Thomann & Zhelyazkova, 2017: 1284), while, at the same time, possibly undermine 
the harmonised working of EU common policies (Jans et al., 2009). Analysing customization thus 
improves our understanding of the extent to which the EU actually influences member state policies, 
how EU policy can be designed in a more effective manner and how domestic implementers resolve 
issues of legal implementation. One member state where such issues and debates feature 
prominently is the Netherlands. Moreover, scholars have shown ‘gold-plating’ (i.e. over-
implementation in a sense) to be largely absent in this member state (Voermans, 2009; Jans et al., 
2009), making the Netherlands a least-likely case for customization. Taken together, this study asks:  
 
RQ: What explains patterns of customization across policy sectors in the Netherlands?  
 
In seeking to answer this question, this study will add to the field of transposition performance in 
general and customization research in particular by, first, expanding on the explanations on 
customization explored so far. Second, it employs innovative operationalizations of various 
predictors, such as administrative capacity and discretion. Third, it presents the first systematic 
explanatory analysis of customization. Fourth, by focusing on the differences between policy sectors, 
rather than member states, this study provides more insight into the extent to which customization 
is specific to policy fields. It will make these contributions by combining the neo-institutionalist 
approaches of rational choice and sociological institutionalism in its theoretical framework, granting 
a key role to transposition actors in explaining customization. Using cumulative link-mixed models, 
this study finds that a higher degree of discretion and number of veto players increase the likelihood 
of customization. Other explanations, such as the preferences of ministers or monitoring by the 
European Commission (EC) do not display significant effects. 
This paper is structured as follows: I begin by discussing the central concepts of this paper and 
provide an overview of the knowledge available on customization. Then I present the theoretical 
approach and the hypotheses following from this approach, after which I discuss the study’s research 
design. Subsequently, I discuss the results and conclude by locating these findings in the broader 
literature.       
Conceptualization 
So, what is all the fuss about? Is customization simply a new buzzword for gold-plating (Morris, 2011) 
or domestication (Bugdahn, 2005) of EU directives? What does it substantively add to the discussion 
on transposition performance? As Fink and Ruffing (2017: 278) point out, customization “goes 
beyond the simple conceptualization of ‘too little-just right-too much’ implementation” by shifting 
the focus towards the problem-solving capacity of domestic implementers. It conceptually detaches 
from compliance in its entirety by taking the issues of implementation that domestic actors face as 
3 
 
its starting point, rather than the effect of the European policy (Mastenbroek, 2018). In other words, 
it operates from a bottom-up approach (Hill & Hupe, 2016). 
A useful way to further circumscribe the concept is by distinguishing it from ‘gold-plating’. The latter 
essentially takes place “when implementation goes beyond the minimum necessary to comply with a 
Directive” (Davidson, 2006 in Voermans, 2009: 83), either by broadening a policy’s scope, refraining 
from employing available derogations or implementing earlier than the given deadline. Although 
gold-plating is to some extent related to customization2, the phenomena differ from one another in 
several ways. To begin with, gold-plating works from a top-down perspective (i.e. from the 
perspective of the EU decision-makers), whereas customization thus works from the opposite. 
Furthermore, gold-plating presupposes compliance, while customization does not. A directive can be 
gold-plated only by overfulfilling the requirements as laid down in the directive. Customization, by 
contrast, takes all non-literal transposition outcomes as possible cases of customization, regardless 
of compliance. In other words, customization can also involve ‘under-implementation’ (e.g. lower 
pricing than allowed by EU policies; Thomann & Zhelyazkova, 2017). Due to these two characteristics, 
gold-plating has become invested with a generally negative undertone, as almost always obstructing 
the effectiveness of the EU common market3 (e.g. European Parliament, 2014). Customization is 
explicitly distanced from this connotation, by being presented as a way for transposition actors to 
deal with domestic problems in a more effective manner (Thomann, 2015). Customization is also 
more meticulous than gold-plating, as it incorporates a distinction between the two dimensions of 
policy change, density and intensity (Knill et al., 2012). Gold-plating, in contrast, blurs the two 
elements (Thomann & Zhelyazkova, 2017). All in all, customization consists of modest adaptations to 
gold-plating rather than being a fundamentally novel concept. Sticking to the earlier analogy of 
transposition colours, customization may be regarded as a deeper, more well-developed shade of the 
same colour in which gold-plating is painted.  
Even though the domestic level takes a central position in customization, it should not be equated 
with domestication (Thomann & Sager, 2017b). This concept, describing a situation when member 
states choose policy options other than those prescribed or advised by ‘Brussels’ (Bugdahn, 2005), 
only denotes one of two general tendencies producing the customized transposition outcome – the 
other being Europeanization (Fink & Ruffing, 2017). When implementers transpose a directive, they 
do not necessarily refrain from EU policy options, but rather tailor the directive to their domestic 
needs. Sometimes this will mean that the transposed legal act is less Europeanized, while in others it 
may be less domesticated. A customized directive, in other words, is a product of some amount of 
either force (Thomann & Sager, 2017a). 
More specifically, the customized directive will have undergone changes in density and 
restrictiveness vis-à-vis the original transposition act. Density concerns the number of policies 
employed to address a policy issue (Knill et al., 2012; Schaffrin et al., 2015). When a provision is 
customized in terms of density, “rules [are either] added to or taken away from an EU requirement” 
(Thomann & Zhelyazkova, 2017: 1271). Restrictiveness (or intensity) refers to the actual substance of 
                                                             
2 Gold-plating can be a form of customization, but only in the sense of overfulfillment of EU requirements, not 
the early implementation of a directive (Thomann, 2015) 
3 Morris (2011: 368) even speaks of “allegations of gold-plating”. 
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a policy instrument4. A policy can have more intensity by, for example, addressing more entities (e.g. 
more types of firms) or a larger territory (e.g. companies in an entire region), as well as broader or 
smaller objectives (Bondarouk & Mastenbroek, 2017). When an issue is addressed more broadly or 
more confined than required by the EU, transposition is customized in terms of intensity. The two 
dimensions are related, but not always in the same direction (i.e. more density is not necessarily 
more intensity and vice versa) and not always materialize simultaneously. 
Literature review 
Although customization is a young concept, several studies of transposition have observed and 
sought to explain instances of over-implementation5 or gold-plating, and as such can provide some 
insight into factors leading to more or less domestic adaptation. The picture that emerges from this 
‘field’ is patchy: some explanations seem to be generally endorsed across the field, but due to the 
qualitative, small-N character of practically all the studies6, operationalizations are inconsistent. As a 
result, findings are at times conflicting or almost idiosyncratic. This is evident in the case of the misfit 
hypothesis, with many scholars concluding that the fit of a directive with the domestic policy 
structure can explain over-implementation, but each conceptualizing and operationalizing ‘misfit’ in a 
substantially different way. Goodness-of-fit is understood either as substantive (Cerna, 2013), 
institutional (Martinsen & Vasev, 2016) or normative (Fink & Ruffing, 2017) misfit, leaving as much 
confusion as in the transposition literature in general (Treib, 2014). As a form of substantive (or legal) 
misfit, most case studies nonetheless find that the domestic pre-existence of conflicting legislation 
enhances the likelihood a directive is transcended (Cerna, 2013; Thomann, 2015; Padgett, 2003; 
Steunenberg, 2007). However, it is generally acknowledged that misfit in itself is insufficient for 
clarifying over-implementation (Mastenbroek, 2018), as it is the preferences of veto players that are 
decisive for (mis)fit to be of significance (Mastenbroek & Kaeding, 2006; Dörrenbacher & 
Mastenbroek, 2017). That is, where veto players prefer some alternative implementation to the 
directive, they are more likely to adapt the policy towards this preferred alternative (Falkner & Treib, 
2008; Falkner et al., 2005). It should be emphasized however that only where the overall preference 
constellation (i.e. the preferences of all relevant transposition actors) is in favour of an alternative 
implementation7, customization becomes more likely (Steunenberg, 2007; Kaya, 2017). Scholars of 
over-implementation are also in unison over the importance of discretion (Cerna, 2013; Falkner et 
al., 2005; Dörrenbacher & Mastenbroek, 2017; Liefferink et al., 2011; Logmani et al., 2017; Martinsen 
& Vasev, 2016; Padgett, 2003), with more legal leeway ‘inviting’ customization. Findings of a more 
isolated character are the importance of public opinion (Fink & Ruffing, 2017) and issue salience 
(Martinsen & Vasev, 2016; Thomann, 2015). 
                                                             
4 Customization only includes substantial intensity (the content of the policy instrument itself), not formal 
intensity (the administrative and procedural capacities that allow for an instrument to be realized). See Bauer & 
Knill, 2014.  
5 Gold-plating is not the same as over-implementation. Not only can instances of customization concern over-
implementation, but ‘double-banking’ (i.e. the overlapping of European and domestic regulation; Voermans, 
2009) would also fall under the header of over-implementation.   
6 All are single or comparative case studies; Falkner et al. (2005) has a broader scope but focuses on explaining 
cases of over-implementation for some directives only.  
7 This does not mean that the preferences of each actor are equally important. Some actors are more powerful 
and, as such, will have a larger say in the direction of transposition. 
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As noted before, no systematic explanatory framework on customization itself is presented in these 
studies, with each work focusing on explaining a single direction of change: over-implementation. 
While Thomann’s (2015) study also considers only one direction of customization8, it adopts a 
broader scope conceptually and empirically. In her qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) of the 
transposition of veterinary drugs regulations she confirms the importance of discretion for 
customization, as well as the large role interests of key actors play. Drawing on compliance 
approaches in her theoretical framework, she also finds that the ‘institutional’ fit (i.e. the fit between 
the directive’s regulatory mode and the so-called domestic interventionist style) reduces 
customization. Although Thomann’s study provides us with important insights, it is limited in several 
respects. First, the study’s research design considerably confines the external validity of its 
theoretical and empirical findings (Thomann, 2015: 1384). The use of fuzzy-set QCA (see Krogslund et 
al., 2014) and focus on one issue area limit the inferential strength of the study’s conclusions. 
Second, the five explanatory variables Thomann distils from the compliance literature cover only a 
share of the most important explanations. She acknowledges herself that possible explanatory 
factors, such as substantive preferences of domestic administrations and the decision-making 
process in Brussels, “were neglected” (2015: 1384). Third, the operationalization of various key 
predictors has limited measurement validity. Discretion is measured employing a binary variable for 
the degree of flexibility of transposition instruments and the institutional fit is operationalized by 
comparing the degree of flexibility of the EU directive to the average degree of coerciveness of 
domestic policy instruments (2015: 1375). Seeking to capture the entire domestic regulatory belief 
system through measuring the degree of coerciveness seems, however, to be an overly ambitious 
enterprise. All in all, this leaves her claim that “compliance approaches cannot fully explain 
[customization]” (2015: 1370) vulnerable to contention. 
Thomann and Zhelyazkova (2017) take off where Thomann (2015) left, by mapping the extent of 
customization in the issue areas of environment and justice and home affairs (JHA). They conclude 
that customization patterns primarily vary across policy sectors, rather than member states. The 
particular direction of customization seems furthermore to be determined mainly according to the 
logic of regulation prevalent in a sector. However, this conclusion is only partly supported by their 
selection of policy areas, as both JHA and environmental directives are generally re-regulatory (i.e. 
market-shaping) policies (Hix & Hoyland, 2011). In other words, all these studies leave the questions 
open of how and why customization differs between fields with de- and re-regulatory modes of 
regulation. Having mapped the ‘known knowns’ and ‘known unknowns’ of customization, I will 
introduce the theoretical approach adopted in this study. 
Theory 
Various groups of actors are involved in the domestic transposition process, but depending on the 
directive at hand, some more than others. In the Netherlands, most directives are largely transposed 
at the ministerial level by civil servants. This is overseen by one or multiple ministers, sometimes 
coordinated by the cabinet as a whole, and administrative actors may also consult interest groups. 
When directives are transposed through bills, the legislature, including opposition parties, scrutinize 
the content of the transposing act (Steunenberg & Rhinard, 2010). This constellation of actors 
creates the foundation for an, at times, complex transposition process: between and among these 
actors, preferences may align or diverge (Steunenberg, 2007). For example, within the group of 
                                                             
8 Thomann (2015) incorporated the presupposition of compliance in her conceptualization of customization. 
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administrative actors, legislative drafters are typically more inclined to stay close to a ‘European’ 
interpretation of a directive, while their managers are more likely to accommodate the policy 
demands of a minister – also where this entails deviating from a directive’s text (Mastenbroek, 2017). 
Likewise, the involvement of more ministers in transposition, particularly when having different 
political affiliations, can entangle conflicting dispositions. In parliament, between governing and 
opposing parties, within the governing coalition and even within parties, differences of opinion on 
transposing a directive can materialize (Dörrenbacher et al., 2015). Together, these actors produce a 
particular transposition outcome.    
In seeking to understand this type of transposition I opt to take a neo-institutionalist approach, 
instead of adopting compliance approaches to analyse a phenomenon that is explicitly distinctive 
from compliance (cf. Thomann, 2015). In my view, none of the institutionalist approaches (rational 
choice, sociological and historical institutionalism) succeeds in explaining these issues 
comprehensively on its own (see Mahoney & Thelen, 2010), leading me to combine – to the extent 
possible and desirable (Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000) – the rational and sociological strands of 
institutionalism for explaining customization. 
Rational choice institutionalism (RCI) assumes actors to make a strategic cost-benefit analysis in 
deciding on their actions and to seek utility maximization (logic of consequences; Shepsle, 1989; Hall 
& Taylor, 1996). Since implementing EU policies can come with adaptation costs (in cases of policy 
misfit, Figure 1A), this helps explain those instances of customization where actors want to stay 
closer to the domestic situation (see Figure 1, situation C1). However, this cannot clarify cases of 
customization where veto players would opt for (rigorous) policy change at the domestic level 
‘beyond’ EU directives (Fink & Ruffing, 2017: 279). This is because at least some actors can be 
expected to prefer maintaining the status quo (due to lower adaptation costs), making it highly 
improbable that the entire domestic preference constellation shifts in favour of this change (direction 
C2 in Figure 1). Only in rare situations where some alternative other than the status quo and the 
literal interpretation of the directive is unanimously preferred, can RCI explain this type of 
customization. Likewise, when the EU obligation and the status quo align (Figure 1B), RCI cannot 
clarify customization (situation C3): costs of customization would always be higher than literal 
implementation. Sociological institutionalism (SI), in turn, postulates that preferences of actors are 
informed considerably by the norms surrounding them (logic of appropriateness; DiMaggio & Powell, 
1991). Domestic actors will have different normative positions, influencing their preferences towards 
and interpretation of a directive (Buller, 2006). Even where there may be substantive fit between the 
domestic situation and the directive, those actors in favour of change away from the status quo and 
the EU directive may socially construct adaptation pressure in this very direction (Figure 1, situation 
C3; Lombardo & Forest, 2015; Graziano et al., 2011). This may of course also occur in case of policy 
misfit (situation C2). In this way, SI helps clarifying those instances that, on the basis of RCI’s 
assumptions alone, seem unlikely candidates for customization (C2 and C3).  
A useful comparison can be made to Steunenberg’s (2007) representation of the transposition 
process (the model on which Figure 1 is built). The model used here differs from Steunenberg’s not 
only in that it does not incorporate the differences within the preference constellation itself, but also 
in that it takes the domestic status quo as starting point. Consequently, it diverges from the 
assumption that “non-literal transposition arises when all relevant domestic actors jointly prefer a 
change of EU policy” (Steunenberg, 2007: 32), as I regard a literal transposition of the directive itself 
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as an alternative, rather than the status quo. In other words, when veto players disagree over 
transposition, a literal implementation is considered less feasible. However, this only holds for cases 
where the status quo and a literal interpretation do not align (Figure 1A). This ‘upturned’ model 
follows from the reversed rationale underpinning customization: a bottom-up rather than top-down 
perspective.  
 
Synthesizing RCI and SI, it follows, first, that I assign a key role to implementation actors in 
customizing directives, rather than, for example, the degree of regulatory misfit. Second, in line with 
customization’s bottom-up take on implementation, I view directives as intervening impulses, not as 
the main stimuli. Hence, I formulate my expectations taking the status quo as starting point, rather 
than the directive. Third, transposition actors will be regarded here as pursuing their own interests in 
reaching a particular transposition outcome, using said strategic calculations. But, fourth, their 
preferences are partly shaped by the institutional and normative environment in which they operate, 
making actors’ interests susceptible to change. This environment consists of European as well as 
(sometimes counteracting) domestic and international norms (Graziano et al., 2011). Following 
Mastenbroek (2017), this effectively means that implementation actors, particularly civil servants, 
will often seek to strike a balance between satisficing European requirements and domestic policy 
demands, with the latter eventually being prioritized when the two are conflicting. It does not mean, 
then, that I assume the preferences of transposition actors to be independent from the EU’s 
‘compliance pull’ (Börzel & Risse, 2012: 3) in their efforts at customization, but simply that domestic 
issues will ultimately have priority. 
The first general expectation that follows from these assumptions is that the literal interpretation of 
a directive must be located outside the domestic preference constellation for customization to occur 
(Cerna, 2013; Kaya, 2017). 
Demin or Dmax 
(B) 
Dmax SQ Dmin LI 
C1 
C2 
SQ = LI 
C3 
Figure 1. Simplified depiction of customization outcomes in cases of policy misfit (A) and fit (B) 
Note: SQ = domestic status quo; LI = literal interpretation of directive; Dmin & Dmax = range of discretion 
granted by directive; C1 = customization towards status quo; C2 and C3 = customization away from status 
quo and directive’s literal interpretation. This figure is a simplification primarily in that it ignores the 
possible outcome where the dimensions of restrictiveness and density are customized in different 
directions. The directions of customization depicted here should not be equated to over- or under-
implementation. 
(A) 
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H1: If the literal interpretation of a policy specified in a directive is not located between the most 
preferred positions of the domestic veto players, customization is more likely9  
Some actors might be keen to maintain the status quo when the directive does not fit perfectly with 
the domestic situation, leading to customization. This situation may be more likely when the number 
of veto players is higher. This expectation follows from the assumption that the status quo, rather 
than a literal interpretation is the starting point for the preferences of actors.    
H2: When the number of veto players involved in transposition is high and the status quo does not 
align with a directive’s literal interpretation, customization is more likely  
Political and administrative actors will put more effort into customizing some issues over others 
(Thomann, 2015). If the electorate does not express its support for the main issue of a directive to be 
handled by the EU (Spendzharova & Versluis, 2013), I expect customization to be more likely: actors 
will be more eager to let diverging domestic policy demands prevail over a literal transposition 
outcome when they believe the public does not support the latter outcome.  
H3: If the policy specified in a directive receives little support from the public to be addressed by the 
EU, customization is more likely  
The interests of political and (to a lesser extent) administrative actors will also be influenced by their 
consultation with interest groups in the transposition process (Jans et al., 2009). Often, such 
consultation procedures are built into a directive’s requirements (Braun & Van den Berg, 2013). 
When more interest groups are involved more intensively in the process, and when the preferences 
of these groups do not align with a directive’s content, implementation actors may experience higher 
pressure to accommodate these interests, deviating from a literal interpretation of the directive 
(Kaya, 2017). It follows that I expect this to make customization more likely.  
H4: When interest groups are involved more intensively in the transposition of a directive, 
customization is more likely 
Another logical corollary of these assumptions is that implementation actors’ preferences will be 
affected by the degree to which they perceive the European Commission (EC) to be ‘monitoring’ the 
implementation, with more perceived pressure improving the likelihood of substantive compliance 
(Dimitrova & Steunenberg, 2016; Mastenbroek, 2017). When extrapolating from this insight, one can 
expect lower perceived pressure to increase the likelihood of customization. 
H5: When perceived pressure by European Commission monitoring is low, customization is more likely  
An additional way in which this balancing act between domestic and European demands can be 
expected to affect the likelihood of customization is through discretion. Without legal leeway, there 
seem to be fewer opportunities for adaptation to domestic conditions (Dörrenbacher & 
Mastenbroek, 2017). While it is indeed possible that implementing actors will transpose a provision 
‘away’ from the literal rule without formally delegated discretion, it will generally enable domestic 
adaptation (Kaya, 2017; Thomann, 2015). 
                                                             
9 Formulation of this hypothesis is adopted partly from Steunenberg (2007). Specifying a particular direction for 
density and restrictiveness would lead to more imprecision, as the relation between the two dimensions (and 
thus directions) is likely to differ across policy sectors. Therefore, I here use a more general formulation 
between predictor and customization.  
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H6: When provisions offer more discretion, customization is more likely 
A factor that is generally neglected in analyses of customization and non-literal transposition, is the 
availability of resources. This is surprising, given that “many studies have confirmed that 
administrative capabilities are an important factor influencing transposition performance” (Treib, 
2014: 26). A higher capacity allows implementing actors to create opportunities for customization, as 
actors will have more information on the consequences of the directive and more abilities to adapt 
the EU legal act (Vasev & Vrangbaek, 2014)10. Clearly, then, administrative capacity may increase the 
likelihood of customization, but only where this is in the interest of domestic actors. 
H7: If a policy area has more administrative capacity and domestic veto players do not favour a literal 
interpretation of the directive, customization is more likely  
In the following section I will discuss the selection of policy areas and directives, as well as the 
operationalization of the dependent, independent and control variables. 
Research design 
Selection of policy areas and directives  
 
As pointed out above, Thomann and Zhelyazkova (2017) find that customization patterns differ 
across policy areas along the particular regulatory logic prevalent in the policy field. To see if this 
expectation holds for other issue areas than those mapped already, this is the main criterion 
according to which I selected three policy areas: social and employment policy, internal market and 
services, and JHA (Appendix, Table A1). While internal market directives are usually deregulatory, 
employment and JHA policies are re-regulatory (Hix & Hoyland, 2011). Moreover, the field of JHA has 
historically been less integrated in the EU’s field of competence than the other two areas. From a 
more pragmatic perspective, these policy fields (particularly internal market) have received relatively 
little attention in the transposition literature. I selected directives within these policy fields for which 
implementation should have been completed several years ago to assure transposition was finalized. 
On a more practical note, I also checked whether the selected directives were included in earlier 
analyses of customization and if sufficiently detailed data on the potential customization of the 
provisions of these directives was available in ex-post evaluations (EPLs).   
 
Dependent variable: customization 
I will measure both dimensions of customization separately by using three categories per dimension. 
In the case of density: less density (-1), no customized density (0) and more density (1). Similar 
categories are used for restrictiveness. With customized density essentially concerning the addition 
or omission of policy rules, this also means that I code a provision as customized where a rule is 
specified further, modified, concretized or transposed only partly. A provision is coded as an instance 
of customized restrictiveness when the procedural, temporal, personal and/or territorial scope is 
transposed with more or less stringency, or when the provision’s content is adapted by clearly 
changing a provision’s objectives or definitions. This may, for example, be a consequence of taking 
advantage of exemptions or options, or the incorporation of a recital in transposition. To ensure 
                                                             
10 It could be argued that customization may also be more likely when capacity is low: even where 
implementing actors would want to customize a directive, their resources and ability simply might not allow for 
it. However, given that the Netherlands is a member state with relatively high capacity, this is unlikely. 
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proper coding and to enable replicability, I have made extensive coding tables with a clarification for 
the coding of each provision. A short overview of the coding scheme and most difficult coding 
decisions can be found in appendix B.  
 
Subsequently, I will aggregate both measures in two ‘customization scores’: one for the amount of 
customization and one for the direction of customization. The ‘amount’ refers to the simple question 
of whether a provision is customized on one dimension only (scored 1), on both dimensions (scored 
2), or not customized at all (0). Concerning the ‘direction’, this measure looks into the type of change 
made to the provision, ranging from -2 (less restrictiveness and density) to 2 (more density and 
restrictiveness). Table 1 provides an overview of this ordinal measure. My measure weighs both 
dimensions equally, as I deem both to be of equal importance.  
 
Table 1. Measurement of direction of customization (scores in parentheses) 
Score per dimension Aggregated customization score 
Less density (-1), less restrictiveness (-1) -1 -1 = -2 
Less density (-1), no change in restrictiveness (0) or 
No change in density (0), less restrictiveness (-1) 
-1 + 0 = -1 
No change in density or restrictiveness (0) or  
Less density (-1), more restrictiveness (1) or  
vice-versa 
0 or -1 + 1 = 0 
More density (1), no change in restrictiveness (0) or 
No change in density (0), more restrictiveness (1) 
0 + 1 = 1 
More density (1), more restrictiveness (1) 1 + 1 = 2 
 
To obtain these scores I will primarily use EPLs. This has considerable downsides (Thomann & 
Zhelyazkova, 2017): 1) EPLs do not always cover transposition beyond compliance, 2) they do not 
provide sufficient information on highly ambiguous directives and 3) establishing the extent of 
customization can be done only in a relative manner (e.g. relative to other policy areas), 4) they do 
not allow for more in-depth coding of customization, in terms of (e.g.) regulatory scope of a provision 
or other categories of policy content (objectives, budget). While these drawbacks considerably limit 
the validity of the data obtained, it is the only type of data that assesses directives in a relatively 
systematic and readily available manner. In cases where an EPL does not provide sufficient data to 
make an informed coding decision, I have consulted the domestic legal provisions to which is being 
referred in the EPL. In relying on these sources, I was unable to code 8.02% of the provisions.  
 
I measure customization on the provision-level, but only consider relevant provisions. That is, I do 
not analyse ‘standard’ provisions, obligatory to be included in all directives, such as the applicability 
of the directive (e.g. ‘this is applicable to all member states’) or provisions specifying the date in 
which the act enters into force (Hartmann, 2016: 426). Relevant articles are those that “provide 
requirements or guidelines to the member states about how to implement the policy specified in the 
directive” (Steunenberg & Toshkov, 2009: 958). A provision is the same as a (sub-)article. Finally, I did 
not consider purely procedural provisions, as these do not need to be transposed.  
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Independent and control variables 
 
I operationalize the preference constellation (H1) by focusing on the preferences of the minister(s) 
responsible for the transposition process, as data on the interests of the main administrative actors 
involved in transposition is either very limited or too time-consuming to collect. I measure the 
‘ministerial preferences’, by first identifying the ministers involved in transposition and their political 
affiliation. Then I take the issue position of the party as the preference of the minister (as used by 
Zhelyazkova et al., 2017). Regarding the number of veto players (hypothesis 2), I take the number of 
actors involved in transposition as an indicator, using information of the EPL, as well as legislative 
indices (Henisz, 2017; Bergman et al., 2003).  
 
I will measure public support for the EU policy by using data from Eurobarometer surveys. These 
include questions on whether respondents want the issue of a directive (or policy area more 
generally) to be a national or EU responsibility, or how the EU’s performance on a policy is regarded 
(Zhelyazkova et al., 2016). For the fourth hypothesis, concerning the degree of interest group 
involvement, I use Jahn’s corporatism index. Although corporatism is a proxy (Kaya, 2017), a more 
valid alternative incorporating the specific interest groups involved in transposition is absent (see 
appendix D for more information). The next predictor, the degree of pressure that domestic actors 
perceive from EC monitoring of the transposition process, is operationalized by taking the number of 
formal letters sent out by the EC concerning a particular directive (Steunenberg & Rhinard, 2010). I 
will obtain data on this from the EC’s CeLex database.        
 
Operationalizing discretion is notoriously difficult (Hartmann, 2016), as legal norms contained in 
directives are nested in a complex way. As suggested by Toshkov (2013) and employed by 
Dörrenbacher & Mastenbroek (2017), I use the Institutional Grammar Tool coding procedure 
(Crawford & Ostrom, 1995; Siddiki et al., 2012) to determine a provision’s degree of discretion (see 
appendix C). As a safety check, I also created a ratio of open and closed statements (Steunenberg & 
Toshkov, 2009). The last predictor is administrative capacity. Although determining the relative 
capacity of different sectors in one member state is challenging (Dimitrova & Steunenberg, 2016), I 
decided to operationalize capacity here as the performance of a sector as evaluated by its top-tier 
managers in the COCOPS survey of 2013 (Jilke et al.). This performance is evaluated according to a 
range of indicators (e.g. ‘policy effectiveness’ and ‘cost and efficiency’) for the question how the 
respondents think their policy area has performed over the last 5 years. I calculate the average score 
for all respondents per ministry in the survey (see appendix D). Unfortunately, this measure displays 
little variation, leading me to exclude it from the main analysis: not only would it add little, it would 
even unnecessarily weaken the effects of the other predictors in the analysis. Its lack of variation may 
point to two conclusions; namely that the measure does not succeed at capturing differences in 
capacity between Dutch administrative units, or that these differences are simply very small. I will 
return to these issues in the discussion of the results.     
 
I will also include two control variables in my analysis. The first, directive complexity, is sometimes 
mentioned as possible intervening variable in the transposition process, affecting the preferences of 
actors (Zhelyazkova, 2013). I will measure this by counting the number of recitals included in the 
directive (Voorst & Mastenbroek, 2017). The second control, legal misfit (e.g. Cerna, 2013), will be 
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gauged using Steunenberg and Toshkov’s (2009) measure. It combines the novelty of a directive and 
the type of national transposition measure used in one indicator. Data for both components can be 
derived from the EPLs of the directives. Unfortunately, data limitations prevented me from 
controlling for a policy area’s ‘interventionist style’. For an overview of the operationalization and 
data of all variables, see table 2, and for a detailed discussion (including on the latter issue) and the 
data itself, see appendix D. 
 
Method 
 
With provisions nested in the 13 directives, the structure of the data is hierarchical: the dependent 
variable is measured on level-1 (i.e. provisions), as well as one independent variable, discretion, while 
the other predictors are all measured on level-2 (i.e. directive). Together with the expectation that 
the direction and strength of the relationships between predictors and outcome variable will differ 
between directives, the use of a method of analysis controlling for the multilevel data structure 
seems warranted (Luke, 2004). At the same time, I must note that the number of groups (i.e. 
directives; N = 13) relative to the sample size (N = 1,072) and level-2 predictors (8) is very small and is 
thus likely to pose problems (cf. Stegmueller, 2013). Moreover, the highest Intra-Class Correlation 
(ICC) of all the models I ran is low (7.15%), indicating low variation between directives. It is the 
former of these concerns that led me to not to include cross-level interactions between predictors, 
nor to resort to a different method, because I believe the argument on the data structure overrides 
these (justified) counterarguments. As both customization measures consist of multiple discrete 
categories, the method of analysis I employ is a multilevel multinomial logistic regression. More 
specifically, I use a cumulative link-mixed model, as available in the ‘ordinal’ package in R 
(Christensen, 2015). As noted before, the size of missing data is not too large, with 7% being the 
highest loss of cases (for customization). I chose to omit every missing case (i.e. complete-case 
analyses).    
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Table 2. Overview of operationalization of variables 
Variable Operationalization Data 
Directive-level 
Administrative capacity Sectoral capacity: average policy sector scores on the indicators of 
performance dimensions in the COCOPS survey (own calculation) 
Jilke et al. (2013) 
Ministerial preferences Issue position of political party of minister Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2015) 
Public EU support Score on survey question for directive’s topic to be an EU competence Eurobarometer  
Interest group diversity Corporatism index Jahn (2016) 
Commission monitoring Number of formal letters per directive CeLex database 
Number of Veto players Veto player index EPLs of corresponding directives; Political constrain 
index and Bergman et al. (2003) index 
 
Control: legal misfit Combined measure of novelty of directive and type of transposition 
measure  
EPLs of corresponding directives  
Control: interventionist style Average share of type of regulatory instruments in policy area EPLs of corresponding directives 
Control: directive complexity Number of recitals per directive Text of directives 
Provision-level 
Discretion Institutional Grammar Tool coding procedure (see appendix C) 
  
Text of directives 
Customization Combined measure of density and restrictiveness  EPLs of corresponding directives 
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Results 
 
I collected information on the customization of 1,072 provisions across 13 directives (see appendix E 
for descriptive statistics). Half of these provisions stem from ‘internal market’-directives, with one 
directive – the 2007 payment services directive – disproportionally contributing 362 cases (see 
appendix E for the distribution of cases). When omitting this directive (as I have done in a robustness 
check, see appendix F), the number of cases is relatively evenly distributed across policy fields, 
between 300 (justice and home affairs) and 186 cases (employment; overall N = 710).     
 
Extent and direction of customization 
 
While, unsurprisingly, the majority of the provisions is not customized at all (662; 61.75%; Table 3), a 
customization rate of almost 40% is relatively high when considering that earlier research on ‘gold-
plating’ of directives in the Netherlands found deviant transposition to be largely absent (Voermans, 
2009; Jans et al., 2011). This difference may in part be ascribed to the fact that customization is a 
broader concept than gold-plating, covering a wider range of transposition outcomes. In most cases 
of customization, provisions are adapted on both dimensions (278), with a clear majority customized 
in a uniform direction (220): either less (114) or more (106) density and restrictiveness. Of instances 
where a provision is customized on one dimension only (italicized in Table 3), most provisions are 
made less restrictive during transposition.   
 
Table 3. Distribution of cases on both dimensions of customization 
                                   Density             
 
Restrictiveness 
Less No change More 
-1 0 1 
Less -1 114 67 19 
No change 0 29 662 20 
More 1 39 16 106 
   
Can area-specific customization patterns be observed for the extent and direction of customization? 
Regarding the former, as can be seen in Figure 2 (left), the average amount of customization is 
relatively similar across policy areas. Although within each policy field one directive always has a 
substantially lower amount of customization than other directives in the sector (e.g. the Noise 
directive), levels of customization are relatively equal across areas. More interesting for our purposes 
here is whether policy fields that are generally re-regulatory, such as employment and JHA, depict a 
pattern of customization in a direction opposite to the deregulatory field of internal market 
directives (Thomann & Zhelyazkova, 2017). Figure 2 (right) does not corroborate this expectation, as 
the scrutinized directives do not exhibit a uniform direction per policy area. Although breaking these 
observations down into the two dimensions does not change the picture (Figure 3), it does show 
that, on average, directives are customized in the same direction for either dimension: in two cases 
only (the 2009 payment and 2004 au pairs directives) were provisions generally customized in 
opposite directions. This also allows me to compare my results to those of Thomann & Zhelyazkova 
(2017: 1279), as they obtained information on the customization of JHA directives in the 
Netherlands. The analysed directives display less customization for both dimensions, a result largely 
15 
 
in line with the directives scrutinized here. One directive (the Return directive) is the odd one out in 
this regard, as it was customized with more density and restrictiveness.       
 
Figure 2. Left: Average amount of customization per directive and policy area (0 = no customization)
    Right: Average direction of customization (0 = no customization; 1 = more density and 
   restrictiveness; -1 = less density and restrictiveness) 
 
 
Figure 3. Average customization direction broken down into density (red) and restrictiveness (blue) 
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Amount of customization 
 
Although no consistent pattern of customization becomes apparent for each policy field, we may still 
be able to discern which factors help to explain customization, beginning with the amount. To this 
end, I estimated two cumulative link-mixed models11, one using the discretion measure of the ratio 
of open and closed statements and one using the IGT as basis for operationalization of discretion 
(Table 4, models 1 and 2 respectively). I only calculated the odds ratios, as no function for the 
calculation of predicted probabilities and first differences is available for these models. Relying on 
the AIC and -2Log-Likelihood (-2LL) to fit each model (as well as non-reported visual diagnostic 
checks) in a stepwise manner, I fitted both models with only random intercepts12. I followed a similar 
estimation process for the other models presented in this paper. 
 
Table 4. Predicting amount of customization, with discretion ratio (model 1) and discretion IGT 
(model 2): odds ratios 
 Model 1 
Discretion (ratio) 
Model 2 
Discretion (IGT) 
 95% CI for odds ratio 95% CI for odds ratio 
Level-1 (Provision) Lower OR Higher Lower OR higher 
Threshold 0|1 0.98 1.27 1.64 1.03  1.43* 1.98 
Threshold 1|2 5.96 7.88* 10.43 0.88 1.25 1.78 
Discretion (IGT)    0.65 0.75* 0.87 
Level-2 (Directive)       
Discretion (ratio) 0.02 0.60 16.38    
Ministerial 
preferences 
0.89 1.18 1.56 0.99 1.33 1.78 
Number of veto 
players 
0.47 0.75 1.21 0.26 0.43* 0.70 
Public EU support 0.59 1.00 1.68 0.58 1.00 1.73 
Corporatism 0.12 1.64 22.22 0.09 1.51 24.42 
EC monitoring 
(directive) 
0.33 0.85 2.19 0.35 0.96 2.64 
Misfit 3.80 7.88 16.34 0.61 1.25 2.55 
Directive complexity 
 
1.26 1.27* 1.28 1.41 1.43* 1.44 
Variance: Intercepts 0.10   0.12   
N (observations) 1,072   1,072   
N (directives) 13   13   
Notes: CLMM ordered logistic regression; models with random intercepts, no random slope(s) 
Odds ratios higher than 1 tell us that, when the value of an independent variable increases by one 
unit, the odds of the outcome (i.e. amount of customization) increase as well. Vice versa, ratios lower 
than 1 inform us of the opposite. In cases where (the lower and upper bounds of) the odds ratios are 
entirely below or above 1, the predictor reaches significance (signified by *). This is the case for only 
few of the predictors. In model 1, only directive complexity turns significant, indicating that as 
                                                             
11 Both models were estimated using a ‘cauchit’ link as this link achieved the highest log-likelihood score. 
12 The ‘ordinal’ package does not include functions that enable the calculation of the error-correction term to 
assess improved fit.  
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complexity increases, the odds of the amount of customization also increase. This effect and its 
direction are confirmed in model 2. In this model, discretion and the number of veto players also 
reach significance, but in the direction opposite from complexity. That is, as provisions offer less 
discretion or when less veto players are involved in transposition, the odds of customization 
decrease as well. 
 
Table 5. Effect of predictors and controls on amount of customization 
 Model 
(random intercepts, 
No random slope) 
CI 99% 
Level-1 (Provision) 
 
  
(Intercept) 
 
        0.51*** 
              (0.10) 
 0.34; 0.68 
Discretion (IGT) 
 
        0.16*** 
              (0.03) 
 0.08; 0.24 
Level-2 (Directive) 
 
  
Ministerial preferences -0.07 
(0.08) 
-0.22; 0.06 
Number of veto players 0.15 
(0.16) 
-0.12; 0.42 
Public EU support 0.13 
(0.18) 
-0.17; 0.43 
Corporatism 0.21 
(0.84) 
-1.24; 1.67 
EC monitoring (directive) 
 
0.33 
(0.32) 
-0.20; 0.89 
Misfit 
 
             -0.15 
(0.22) 
-0.53; 0.23 
Directive complexity              -0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.01; 0.00 
AIC 2700.16  
BIC 2754.91  
-2LL 2678.16  
N 1072  
N groups 13  
Variance country (intercept) 0.06  
Variance residual 0.68  
Notes: MLM OLS regression; p-values based on 99% confidence intervals; *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
To check these findings, I also modelled a linear multilevel OLS regression with provision-level 
discretion (also only random intercepts; Table 5). Although in principle fitting a linear regression to a 
multinomial dependent variable is inadequate (as diagnostic tests also indicate), it may be useful as a 
double-check. However, the model does not corroborate some of the earlier findings, as it only finds 
a strong positive significant effect for discretion (at p<0.001). It does find, in line with the two other 
models, that the majority of predictors cannot explain the amount of customization (at least with this 
data; see discussion below). Interestingly, as the residual variance is very low (0.68), there does not 
seem to be much un-modelled variability (Luke, 2004: 28). For the OLS, the exclusion of the 
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disproportionally large 2007 payment services directive displays identical results (Appendix E, Table 
E2). The CLMM with discretion at provision-level also has similar results as in model 2, Table 4, but 
the direction of the effect of the number of veto players changes towards a positive effect (Appendix 
E, Table E1).  
 
Direction of customization 
 
Concerning the direction in which provisions are customized, most predictors exhibit a similar 
absence of significant effects (Table 6). In the model with the discretion ratio, only the controls misfit 
and complexity show a positive significant effect. These effects – and their directions – hold in the 
model with discretion measured through the IGT, but discretion and the number of veto players also 
significantly increase the odds of customization. This means, in other words, that the odds of 
customization in direction of more restrictiveness and/or density increase as the number of veto 
players increase. Interestingly, these findings are contradicted by the linear model (Table 7), with 
none of the predictors nor controls displaying significant effects. This raises the question why these 
models display such different results? Finding the right answer to this question proved challenging, 
as the random effects and predictors used in both models are identical. To strike middle ground, I 
also estimated a binomial version of the model (Table E3, Appendix E). The results largely echo those 
of the multinomial model, with the IGT measure of discretion, number of veto players and public EU 
support all demonstrating significance.         
Table 6. Predicting direction of customization, with discretion ratio (model 1) and discretion IGT 
(model 2): odds ratios 
 Model 1 
Discretion (ratio) 
Model 2 
Discretion (IGT) 
 95% CI for odds ratio 95% CI for odds ratio 
Level-1 (Provision) Lower OR Higher Lower OR higher 
Threshold -2|-1 0.81 1.46 2.61 0.50  0.92 1.69 
Threshold -1|0 0.27 0.27* 0.38 1.01    1.52* 2.27 
Threshold  0|1 1.24 0.73 2.08 0.73 1.24 2.12 
Threshold  1|2 143.87 73.68 280.91 87.18 171.00* 335.44 
Discretion (IGT)    0.45    0.56* 0.69 
Level-2 (Directive)       
Discretion (ratio) 0.08 8.15 836.95    
Ministerial preferences 0.69 1.00 1.44 0.69 1.00 1.44 
Number of veto players 0.32 0.58 1.07 4.91   8.70* 15.40 
Public EU support 0.76 1.46 2.80 0.49 0.92 1.70 
Corporatism 0.01 0.36 14.04 0.01 0.32 11.10 
EC monitoring 
(directive) 
0.07 0.27 1.04 0.42 1.52 5.51 
Misfit 50.11 143.87* 413.06 67.77 171.00* 431.51 
Directive complexity 
 
1.22 1.24* 1.25 1.23 1.24* 1.25 
Variance: Intercepts 0.10   0.10   
N (observations) 1,072   1,072   
N (directives) 13   13   
Notes: CLMM ordered logistic regression; models with random intercepts, no random slope(s) 
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Table 7. Effect of predictors and controls on direction of customization 
 Model 
(random intercepts, 
No random slope) 
CI 99% 
Level-1 (Provision) 
 
  
(Intercept) 
 
        2.83*** 
              (0.13) 
  2.63; 3.04 
Discretion (IGT) 
 
 0.05 
              (0.04) 
 -0.04; 0.14 
Level-2 (Directive) 
 
  
Ministerial preferences 0.10 
(0.10) 
-0.08; 0.26 
Number of veto players 0.09 
(0.20) 
-0.25; 0.41 
Public EU support              -0.14 
(0.23) 
-0.51; 0.22 
Corporatism 1.13 
(1.06) 
-0.79; 2.79 
EC monitoring (directive) 
 
0.61 
(0.40) 
-0.10; 1.24 
Misfit 
 
             -0.41 
(0.28) 
-0.85; 0.09 
Directive complexity              -0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.01; 0.01 
AIC 2978.68  
BIC 3033.43  
-2LL 2678,16  
N 1072  
N groups 13  
Variance country (intercept) 0.10  
Variance residual 0.89  
Notes: MLM OLS regression; p-values based on 99% confidence intervals; *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
Discussion 
 
To summarize, the vast majority of the predictors do not display a significant effect for both the 
amount and the direction of customization, across all different models. Only two explanatory 
variables exhibit significant effects and odds in some models: discretion (when measured at the 
provision-level) and the number of veto players. Regarding the former, this seems to have the most 
robust positive effect on the amount of customization, reaching significance in the logistic and linear 
models. The odds for the direction of customization also decrease when the direction decreases (i.e. 
towards less restrictiveness and/or density) in the bi- and multinomial models, but the linear model 
does not confirm this finding. All in all, the expectation that more discretion increases the likelihood 
of customization is confirmed however (hypothesis 6). As for the number of veto players, the results 
are contradictory: when including the discretion ratio as measure, its odds become insignificant for 
amount and direction, but when measuring discretion through the IGT, positive odds ratios can be 
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found on both accounts, as well as in the binomial model. At the same time, the two linear models 
do not display significant effects for the number of veto players, although the relation is positive in 
either case. Taken together, I tentatively confirm the expectation formulated in hypothesis 2 that a 
higher number of veto players increases the likelihood of customization. The hypotheses for the 
other predictors (ministerial preferences, support from the public, corporatist arrangements, 
monitoring by the EC) are all rejected and, at least based on this data, can be said not to be sufficient 
explanations in its own as to why transposition actors customize. Of the control variables, the 
complexity of a directive was found to significantly increase the odds of the amount and direction of 
customization, although this observation is disputed by the linear models. The legal compatibility 
between directives and the domestic legal situation exhibits a similar pattern, but only for the 
direction of customization.        
 
To a considerable extent, these results do not conform with previous scholarly work on 
customization, ‘gold-plating’, or non-literal transposition more generally (in as far such a clear line 
can be discerned at all). Comparing to, for example, Thomann (2015), the only explanations tested in 
both studies that display similar directions are the positive associations of discretion and a higher 
number of veto players. Rather than dismissing (or at least nuancing) the findings of other studies in 
the field, I think it is more useful to look at some of the limitations of this research itself. The most 
prominent of these concerns my operationalization of the dependent variable, customization. In 
most of my coding decisions, I relied on ex-post evaluations, which not only restricted me in the 
possibility to create a more in-depth measure, but also limited the validity of the measure employed. 
Although I mitigated this concern by taking the domestic legal texts in most cases into account in my 
coding procedure, it remains a justified point of discussion. A second, equally dubitable issue is the 
structure of the data. With too few groups and cases, but too many predictors at the directive-level, 
the results are far from robust. At the same time, data and time limitations did not allow for more 
measures with provisions as unit of analysis, while excluding some higher-level predictors from the 
analysis would inevitably lead to omitted variable bias. Addressing this matter nevertheless did not 
insulate my research from this objection, as I did not include theoretically warranted cross-level 
interactions in my analysis. Another limitation concerning the omission of variables is the exclusion 
of the domestic interventionist style as control. As I also shortly discuss in the appendix, it was 
unclear to me how to operationalize this variable, as the directions and descriptions on which to rely 
are rather vague. In other words, inclusion of an ill-specified and -operationalized variable would 
have impeded rather than improved the analysis. Finally, I also leave out administrative capacity. 
Although this measure has proven insufficiently adequate to include in the analysis, due to a lack of 
variation between policy areas, I think it exemplifies the importance of attempting new ways to 
measure variables in quantitative transposition scholarship. Often invalid or simply inadequate 
measures are employed and become practically a standard in the field (e.g. the World Bank 
‘government effectiveness’ index as measure of capacity). I readily acknowledge that some of the 
operationalizations used in the analysis here help perpetuate the validity of this criticism (e.g. 
corporatism) and that the limited availability of data confines the options of the researcher, but it 
remains of paramount importance to develop and follow new ways of operationalizing factors 
featuring as explanations in much of the transposition literature – even if they turn out unsuccessful, 
as in this case.    
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Conclusion 
 
At its core, customization denotes the efforts of a range of political, civil society and administrative 
actors in flexibly “settling the boundaries of EU law” (Mastenbroek, 2017: 1299). In this contribution I 
hope to have shown how this perspective offers a novel (though not entirely original) way to study 
transposition. Most importantly, by taking a bottom-up approach to transposition, customization 
highlights the domestic side of implementation. In order to explain why actors customize, and 
whether these patterns of customization are contingent to the regulatory logic of policy fields, I 
combined the tenets of rational choice and sociological institutionalism. Analysing 13 directives in 
the Netherlands from both de- and re-regulatory fields of policy, no clear differences in the extent of 
customization could be discerned between areas. Through the use of multilevel ordinal and linear 
regressions, I found that a higher degree of discretion and number of veto players increase the 
likelihood of customization. Other explanations, such as the preferences of ministers or corporatist 
arrangements did not display significant results.   
 
These findings have several implications. On a practical level, this study tells us that offering 
discretion can be a useful tool for the adaptation of EU law, although it may also impede the 
harmonization of these policies. The relatively high percentage of customized provisions draws into 
question the effectiveness of one-size-fits-all solutions that – however broadly formulated – EU 
directives often put forward. This inevitably brings us to the normative implications of these findings. 
With directives speaking to a wide range of different contexts and actors, each with different 
economic, social and cultural conditions, customization can hardly be considered a black-and-white 
matter in terms of desirability. Where there is great disparity between member states in the contexts 
of implementation, customization may actually lead to higher effectiveness of policies. This is least 
likely to be advantageous if a policy has negative cross-border effects. Customization may also be an 
effective, yet indirect way to improve accountability, given that context-sensitive implementers can 
strengthen the legitimacy of EU policies at lower governance levels.     
 
As this study is the first systematic explanatory analysis of customization, a wide range of issues 
remain to be explored, three of which I will highlight here. Most importantly, customization itself is 
still in need of clearer delineation. Current literature seems to place customization at different places 
in the conceptual field, thereby complicating research on the phenomenon and the cumulation of 
the findings that follow from it. As a second avenue for further research, students of customization 
would do well to broaden their horizon towards other policy areas and member states. As this study 
has a limited scope, an even more extensive comparison between policy fields with different logics 
would be particularly valuable. A similar recommendation can be made for the development of 
measures with higher validity for customization and the preferences of key actors, that can relatively 
easily be used in quantitative analyses. These efforts are highly warranted not only in the nascent 
strand of customization scholarship but are relevant to transposition research more generally as well. 
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Table A1. Selected directives 
EU directive Policy content Corresponding ex-post evaluations13 
Employment and social policy 
2001/23/EC Transfer of undertakings Middlesex University (2007) 
2009/104/EC Work equipment COWI, Milieu & IOM (2015) 
2003/10/EC Noise COWI, Milieu & IOM (2015) 
2002/74/EC Employer insolvency Middlesex University (2006)* 
2004/37/EC Carcinogens and mutagens COWI, Milieu & IOM (2015) 
Internal market and services 
2006/123/EC Services Stelkens et al. (2015); Milieu (2011)* 
2005/56/EC Cross-border mergers Lexidale (2013)* 
2007/64/EC Payment Services Tipik (2013)* 
2009/110/EC Payment services Tipik (2013)* 
Justice and home affairs 
2008/115/EC Return Milieu (2013)*; Hartmann (2016) 
2008/52/EC Mediation Milieu (2013)* 
2004/114/EC Au pairs GHK Consulting (2010)* 
2004/38/EC Citizens’ rights Milieu (2008)* 
*Reports have been used by Zhelyazkova et al. (2017) to collect data on these directives for the 
relation between notified and substantive compliance.
                                                             
13 I am indebted to Stijn van Voorst for providing the updated dataset of Van Voorst & Zwaan (2018) consisting 
of most (if not all) ex-post evaluations produced by the EU’s DGs and EC. I am also thankful to Asya Zhelyazkova 
for providing me with the EPLs of the JHA policy field. 
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Appendix B: Customization coding decisions 
In this appendix, the coding scheme is shown with examples for each decision from the actual coding tables. I created tables including the directive (sub-
)article (i.e. provision), the directive text of the provision, the relevant legal articles transposing the provision, the information from the EPL on transposition 
and my coding decision. I used similar tables to code all other provisions, but due to confidentiality of the included information from the EPLs, as well as the 
large size of the tables (app. 900 pages in total), the tables are only available on request.   
No customization:  
- No use of exemption or expansion 
 
       Example from return directive: 
4(2) This Directive shall be without prejudice 
to the right of Member States to adopt or 
maintain provisions that are more 
favourable to the persons to whom it 
applies. 
 
Not transposed  Article 4 has not been transposed  
 
Article 4(2) allows Member States to 
maintain or introduce provisions that 
are more favourable to third-country 
nationals covered by Directive 
2004/114/EC, provided they are 
compatible with the Directive. This 
Article did not need to be literally 
transposed by Member States (as, for 
example, more favourable provisions 
could be adopted in relation to other 
Articles in the Directive), nor was its 
transposition compulsory. 
 
By not transposing this 
provision, the directive is 
not customized. Since the 
transposition of these 
definitions is not 
compulsory, non-
transposition in this case 
amounts to non-
customization. 
 
D = 0 
R = 0 
 
 
- Transposition of the provision is literal 
 
       Example from 2007 payment services directive: 
3(c) (c) professional physical transport of 
banknotes and coins, including their 
collection, processing and delivery; 
Art. I (D)(2)(c) 
professional physical transport 
of banknotes and coins, 
Yes Article I (D)(2)(c) of RD 436 
transposes Article 3, point (c) 
of the Directive. 
The provision has been 
transposed literally.  
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 including their collection, 
processing and delivery; 
 
The Dutch provision has 
transposed the provision of 
the Directive almost in a literal 
way. 
 
D = 0 
R = 0 
 
Customization on both dimensions, in opposite or same direction: 
- A rule is added or taken away in transposition, is less or more detailed, while the substance (objectives, content) and/or (procedural, territorial, 
personal, temporal) scope is transposed with more or less stringency  
- A recital is incorporated in the transposition of a provision, leading to a divergence of a literal interpretation of the provision 
- The transposition actors take advantage of an option provided by the directive, either expanding on or exempting itself from an obligation 
 
        Example from 2009 payment services directive of customization in opposite direction: 
3(3)5 If a holding is acquired despite the 
opposition of the competent authorities, 
those authorities shall, regardless of any 
other sanction to be adopted, provide for 
the exercise of the voting rights of the 
acquirer to be suspended, the nullity of 
votes cast or the possibility of annulling 
those votes. 
Article 3:108a of the Financial 
Supervision Act (4) When a 
holding is acquired despite the 
opposition of the Dutch 
Central Bank, the Dutch 
Central Bank can determine, 
regardless of any other 
sanction to be adopted, that 
the exercise of the voting 
rights of the acquirer shall be 
suspended or that the votes 
cast shall be void. 
Yes Article 3:108a paragraph 4 of 
the Financial Supervision Act 
identically transposes Article 3 
paragraph 3, subparagraph 4 
of the Directive. 
Article 3 paragraph 3, 
subparagraph 5 of the 
Directive requires when a 
holding is acquired despite 
opposition from the 
competent authorities, that 
these authorities shall 
suspend the exercise of voting 
rights of the acquirer and the 
nullity of votes cast. 
In this regard, Article 3:108a 
paragraph 4 of the Financial 
Supervision Act indicates that 
The annulment of votes is 
omitted from the possible 
measures to be taken by 
the Central Bank, meaning 
the provision is transposed 
with less density (a rule is 
omitted) and more 
restrictiveness (the 
substantive scope is more 
stringent). 
 
D = -1 
R = 1 
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the Dutch Central Bank can 
determine, when a holding is 
acquired despite its opposition 
and regardless of any other 
sanctions, that the exercise of 
the voting rights shall be 
suspended or the nullity of the 
votes cast. 
Conformity with the 
requirements of Article 3 
paragraph 3, subparagraph 5 
of the Directive is thus 
observed. 
 
 
Example from cross-border mergers directive of customization in same direction, with more density and restrictiveness: 
 
2(2)a ‘merger’ means an operation whereby: 
(a) one or more companies, on being 
dissolved without going into liquidation, 
transfer all their assets and liabilities to 
another existing company, the acquiring 
company, in exchange for the issue to 
their members of securities or shares 
representing the capital of that other 
company and, if applicable, a cash 
payment not exceeding 10 % of the 
nominal value, or, in the absence of a 
nominal value, of the accounting par 
value of those securities or shares; 
or 
 
325(2): 
Indien krachtens de 
ruilverhouding van de 
aandelen recht bestaat op 
geld of schuldvorderingen, 
mag het gezamenlijke bedrag 
daarvan een tiende van het 
nominale bedrag van de 
toegekende aandelen niet te 
boven gaan. 
Yes Triangular mergers possible in 
Article 2.333a DCC; 
 
It rules that a 10% threshold is 
only applicable if a surviving 
entity is a Dutch entity (Article 
2:325(2), Article 2:333a); 
 
A dissolved legal person may 
not merge if a distribution has 
already been made out of its 
property on account of a 
winding-up (liquidation). Cash 
payment, as referred to in 
Article 2(2)(a) Directive, may 
not exceed 10 percent of the 
The territorial scope of the 
provision is more 
restrictive. This led Dutch 
transposition actors to add 
another policy rule. 
 
D = 1 
R = 1 
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aggregate nominal value of 
the shares allotted in the 
surviving entity’s capital, if the 
surviving entity is Dutch 
(Article 2:325(2) DCC). 
Therefore, two types of 
mergers from Articles 2(2)(a) 
and (b) Directive were 
transposed by the Dutch. 
 
 
Example from citizen’s rights directive of customization in same direction, with less density and restrictiveness: 
3(2)2 The host Member State shall 
undertake an extensive examination 
of the personal circumstances and 
shall justify any denial of entry or 
residence to these people. 
Article 3:2, 
3:46, 3:47, para 1, General 
Administrative Law Act 
 
Article 3:2 
When preparing an order an 
administrative authority shall 
gather the necessary 
information concerning the 
relevant facts and 
the interests to be weighed. 
Article 3:46 
An order shall be based on 
proper reasons. 
Article 3:47 
1. The reasons shall be stated 
when the order is notified. 
[…] 
 
Yes These are guarantees given by the 
Directive to limit the MS discretion 
and thus have to be transposed. The 
NL legislation is not precise enough 
to comply with the requirement of 
carrying out an “extensive 
examination of the personal 
circumstances”. However it depends 
on the treatment given by the NL to 
other family members, i.e., the 
facilitation. In principle the NL treats 
them as the core familiy members 
Therefore, then they have a right and 
thus there is no need to carry out the 
exhaustive examination. The margin 
of discretion for authorities seems 
already quite limited. 
The order to issue a visa is to be 
considered as a (administrative) 
decision ex General Administrative 
The provision is not 
transposed with enough 
specificity, meaning the 
directive is customized 
with less density and 
restrictiveness. 
 
D = -1 
R = -1 
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Law Act. 
 
 
Customized with more or less density, no change in restrictiveness: 
- A rule is either explicitly added or omitted, but the substantive scope remains identical 
 
       Example from the insolvency directive: 
Article EU obligation National provision, if referred 
to in EPL (in Dutch)14 
Fully in 
accord? 
Notes/Issues 
(copied from EPL) 
Coding decision 
1(1) This Directive shall apply to employees' 
claims arising from contracts of 
employment or employment 
relationships and existing against 
employers who are in a state of 
insolvency within the meaning of Article 
2(1). 
IV WW 61: 
Een werknemer heeft recht op 
uitkering op grond van dit 
hoofdstuk, indien hij van een 
werkgever, die in staat van 
faillissement is verklaard, aan 
wie surséance van betaling is 
verleend, ten aanzien van wie 
de schuldsaneringsregeling 
natuurlijke personen van 
toepassing is, of die anderszins 
verkeert in de blijvende 
toestand dat hij heeft 
opgehouden te betalen, loon, 
vakantiegeld, of vakantiebijslag 
te vorderen heeft of indien hij 
geldelijk nadeel kan 
ondervinden doordat deze 
werkgever bedragen die hij in 
verband met de 
dienstbetrekking met de 
werknemer aan derden 
verschuldigd is, niet heeft 
betaald. 
No Article 1(1) of the Directive 
has not been specifically 
implemented. In the Dutch 
legislator’s view, Title IV WW 
already provided the 
guarantees prescribed by the 
Directive. 
 
With the provision not 
having been implemented 
specifically, the provision is 
customized with less 
density, but not more 
restrictively, as the 
substantive scope of the 
Dutch law remains similar. 
 
D = -1 
R = 0  
 
- A provision is transposed with more or less detail, but the content and scope remain the same 
                                                             
14 http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0004045/2018-04-01#HoofdstukIV; http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0001860/2018-01-01#TiteldeelIII;  
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Example from the Carcinogens directive: 
4(1) The employer shall reduce the use of a 
carcinogen or mutagen at the place of 
work, in particular by replacing it, in 
so far as is technically possible, by a 
substance, preparation or process which, 
under its conditions of use, is not 
dangerous or is less dangerous to 
workers' health or safety, as the case may 
be. 
 
AB 4.17 
Zodanige technische en 
organisatorische maatregelen 
zijn genomen dat de kans op 
blootstelling van werknemers 
aan kankerverwekkende of 
mutagene stoffen of stoffen die 
vrijkomen bij 
kankerverwekkende processen 
zoveel mogelijk bij de bron 
daarvan wordt voorkomen, met 
name door kankerverwekkende 
of mutagene stoffen en 
kankerverwekkende processen, 
voor zover dit technisch 
uitvoerbaar is, te vervangen 
door stoffen of processen 
waarbij de werknemers, gelet 
op de eigenschappen van die 
stoffen of processen, de aard 
van de arbeid, de 
werkmethoden en de 
werkomstandigheden, niet of 
minder aan gevaar voor hun 
veiligheid of gezondheid worden 
blootgesteld. 
 
Yes No information provided by 
EPL, only reference to relevant 
Dutch legal article 
Dutch law is more specific 
by emphasizing the 
particular characteristics of 
the substance to replace 
the carcinogen or mutagen 
(i.e. the particular 
conditions of use). In other 
words, the provision is 
customized with more 
density. It is not 
customized with more or 
less intensity, because the 
substantive scope remains 
the same. 
 
D = 1 
R = 0 
 
Example from the Return directive; the coding decision in this instance was difficult for density (as indicated in bold in the column on the right):  
3(5) 5. ‘removal’ means the enforcement 
of the obligation to return, namely the 
physical transportation out of the 
Member State; 
 
  No definition of removal was 
transposed in Dutch law. It can be 
deduced from several provisions that 
the implicit definition used in the 
system of the law is conform to the 
Directive, and involves the physical 
removal out of the Netherlands, to 
enforce the obligation to return. 
Difficult (D) 
By not explicitly defining 
‘removal’, but essentially 
retaining the same scope 
of the provision, the 
provision is customized 
with less density and no 
change in restrictiveness. 
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Removal can only take place after 
the voluntary period for departure, 
though it is already possible to 
impose freedom-restricting 
measures on the alien during this 
period if there are reasons to 
assume the alien will try to abscond 
or hamper the expulsion procedures.  
 
 
D = -1 
R = 0 
 
Customized with more or less restrictiveness, no change in density: 
- The provision is transposed with more or less stringency/broader or smaller scope, but the number of rules and their specificity are identical to 
the original provision 
 
       Example from the mediation directive:  
2(1)b (b) mediation is ordered by a court;   Wet implementatie richtlijn nr. 
2008/52/EG, article 1 b  
b. parties accept a judges`  
proposal to mediate  
 
Yes Effective transposition  
The court does not order 
mediation since 
mediation is not 
compulsory in the 
Netherlands. However, 
a judge can propose 
mediation. It is up to the 
parties to decide 
whether or not they 
accept the proposal to 
enter into mediation.  
 
 
Difficult (D) 
The provision is 
customized with less 
restrictiveness (the rule is 
less stringent) and no 
change in density. 
 
D = 0 
R = -1 
 
 
Missing cases: 
- Too little information to make a sufficiently informed coding decision 
 
       Example from services directive: 
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20(1) Member States shall ensure that the 
recipient is not made subject to 
discriminatory requirements based on his 
nationality or place of residence. 
 
  No information provided by 
EPL 
Too little information 
available to make an 
informed judgment on 
customization. 
 
D = NA 
R  = NA 
 
- Decision proved too difficult to make, regardless of information (3 instances in total) 
 
Example from 2007 payment services directive: 
80(1) Member States shall ensure that 
procedures are set up which allow 
payment service users and other 
interested parties, including consumer 
associations, to submit complaints to the 
competent authorities with regard to 
payment service providers' alleged 
infringements of the provisions of 
national law implementing the provisions 
of this Directive. 
  Under the General 
Administrative Act of the 
Netherlands the procedures 
for objecting against a 
decision or the possibility to 
appeal are included. The rules 
are included in Chapter 6, 7 
and 8 of this Act. Furthermore, 
the Law on Financial 
Supervision provides in Article 
4:17 that a financial service 
provider should adequately 
deal with complaints from its 
clients. Because the Dutch 
legal system provides for the 
possibility to object or to 
appeal it before the 
competent Court, the 
provision is conform with this 
provision of the Directive. The 
Dutch competent authority for 
Difficult 
Insufficient information to 
code. 
 
D = NA 
R = NA 
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complaints is the Authority 
Financial Markets 
(http://www.afm.nl/) 
 
 
Some examples of difficult coding decisions (109 in total): 
- The direction of customization on one dimension is not clear 
 
        Example from return directive: 
16(3) 3. Continuity of residence shall not be 
affected by temporary absences not 
exceeding a total of six months a year, or 
by absences of a longer duration for 
compulsory military service, or by one 
absence of a maximum of 12 consecutive 
months for important reasons such as 
pregnancy and childbirth, serious illness, 
study or vocational training, or a posting 
in another Member State or a third 
country. 
 
Article 8.17, para 2, AD 2000 
 
2. For calculating uninterrupted 
residence as referred to in 
paragraph 1, no interruption also 
includes absence from the 
Netherlands: 
a. for a maximum of six months 
a year; 
b. for a one-off period of not 
more than twelve consecutive 
months for compelling reasons; 
c. to fulfil military service; or 
d. due to secondment for 
carrying out work. 
 
No Incomplete transposition 
Although the wording of the text is 
different, the meaning of both 
provisions is identical. However, the 
Dutch provision does not explicitly 
mention what important reasons 
justify absence of a maximum of 12 
consecutive months except for one 
(posting in another country, i.e. 
secondment mentioned sub d). Thus, 
legal certainty that for instance 
pregnancy constitutes an important 
(compelling) reasons is lacking. 
Difficult (R) 
The Dutch provision 
omits reasons for 
absence of max 12 
consecutive months, 
meaning the provision is 
customized with less 
density and more 
restrictiveness (as less 
reasons for a restrictive 
measure are specified). 
 
D = -1 
R = 1 
 
 
- A provision is customized in opposing directions on one dimension in the same provision  
There are only three instances of this case and because all are rather long, I do not include these here. Where, for example, the territorial scope of the 
provision is broadened vis-à-vis the original provision, while the temporal scope is restricted, I decided to aggregate these instances, meaning that for 
this example, I scored restrictiveness as 0. 
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- It is not clear whether the provision is customized, mainly due to ambiguous formulation of the EU provision or broad formulation of the 
provision 
 
Example from the return directive: 
17(5) The best interests of the child shall be 
a primary consideration in the context 
of the detention of minors pending 
removal. 
 
   
It can be argued that putting 
unaccompanied minors, even only 
for two weeks, in youth penitentiary 
facilities is not in the best interests of 
the child. However, the national 
authorities clarified that detention is 
only used as a matter of last resort 
when other sufficient but less coercive 
measures can-not be applied 
effectively, pursuant to the general 
principles of Dutch administrative law.  
 
Difficult 
With minors possibly 
being detained in 
penitentiary facilities, the 
provision is transposed 
with more restrictiveness 
(more stringency) and 
more density (an 
additional rule). 
 
D = 1 
R = 1 
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Appendix C: Operationalization of discretion and coding decisions 
 
I operationalized ‘discretion’ using the Institutional Grammar Tool (Crawford & Ostrom, 1995). The 
IGT coding scheme consists of five elements, each of which refers to a different syntactic element of 
a statement (Table C1). The only elements considered for my purposes here are the deontic (i.e. type 
of prescription) of a statement, the condition (i.e. the requirements or restrictions for the aim of the 
statement) and the aim of the statement (Dörrenbacher & Mastenbroek, 2017). Because 
Dörrenbacher and Mastenbroek (2017) do not quantify their measure, I will do this here.  
Table C1. Institutional Grammar Tool components 
IGT element Description (Basurto et al., 2010; 
Siddiki et al., 2012) 
 
Note 
Deontic The type of prescription Indicated by e.g. permitted, obliged, 
forbidden, may, must, should, must not, 
should not 
 
Condition  Conditions set the prerequisites or 
restrictions on the aim 
When and where the aim is allowed, 
required or forbidden15; indicated by e.g. 
if, unless, when, only, where, provided 
that 
 
aIm The goal or action to which the deontic 
refers 
What action is conducted and how the 
action is conducted 
 
Attribute The subject of the provision; the agent 
charged with performing a particular 
action 
“[when specified] this component 
[usually] leaves no discretion” 
(Dörrenbacher & Mastenbroek, 2017: 5), 
hence I did not include it in my 
measurement 
 
The most important element of a statement in terms of discretion is the deontic. I consider a deontic 
(e.g. ‘may’, ‘shall’, ‘must’) to be most indicative for the degree of discretion granted. But the deontic 
is not the only relevant component for a statement’s permissiveness (Dörrenbacher & Mastenbroek, 
2017: 13). Regularly the deontic’s permissiveness is bounded by the particular conditions and aims 
that are specified in the statement. In case a condition leaves (the temporal, spatial and/or 
procedural) possibilities largely open to the member state16, I consider the condition to be 
‘permissive’. For example, “Art 14.3 [of the reception condition directive] obliges reception 
authorities to lodge children together with their parents, ‘if appropriate,’ which leaves member 
states discretion regarding the definition of appropriateness.” (Dörrenbacher & Mastenbroek, 2017: 
5). Of course, permissive conditions are still limitations, leading me to assume the specification of 
any condition – permissive or restrictive – to be less permissive than the absence of conditions. 
While a statement always specifies an aim, the degree to which the aim is detailed indicates a 
particular extent of discretion. In other words, a statement granting much discretion has a permissive 
                                                             
15 Basurto et al.: also ‘if’ and ‘unless’; when no condition specified, it is assumed to apply at all times 
16 It does not matter whether the condition specifies the application of a permission or obligation (cf. 
Hartmann, 2016: 429). 
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deontic, does not specify further conditions and specifies the aim of the deontic restrictively (e.g. 
‘you may pass’). Vice versa, a statement offering little leeway has an obligatory deontic, specifies two 
or more restrictive conditions and spells out the aim extensively (e.g. ‘students should wear blue, 
tailor-made uniforms at all times and come to school by bike’). 
Not all components of a statement are equally indicative of discretion. Following Hartmann (2016: 
429), I use the deontic as the main indicator of discretion and then the number and type of 
condition. Finally, I also evaluate the aim, but I consider this component to be the least indicative. As 
a consequence, I weigh the three components differently. When provisions consist of two or more 
sub-articles – which they not seldom do –, the average score of the degree of discretion of the 
articles is taken as the score for the overall provision (in line with Dörrenbacher & Mastenbroek, 
2017: 6). This creates the following calculation of discretion: 
Discretion of sub-article = (2*D) + (1*C) + (0,5*I) 
Discretion of provision = [A1 = (2*D) + (1*C) + (0,5*I)] + [A2 = (2*D) + (1*C) + (0,5*I)]\Atot 
With A = sub-article in provision, D = deontic, C = condition, I = aim, Atot = total number of sub-
articles of provision 
For each component, I created categories ranging from 0 (granting little to no discretion) to 1 
(granting high discretion), as specified in Table 2. 
Table C2. Coding scheme of IGT elements 
Discretion categories per IGT element 
(in order of permissiveness) 
Description of indicator(s) Score  
Deontic   
Permissive May, shall, permitted17 1,0 
Hybrid May and shall 0,5 
Obligatory Shall, must, obliged, forbidden, no deontic 0,0 
Condition    
No condition  1,0 
Permissive condition A condition that specifies the possibilities of the 
member state to a limited extent (i.e. not detailed)  
and/or uses no restrictive language (e.g. ‘where 
relevant’)18 
0,80 
Two or more permissive conditions  0,70 
Permissive and restrictive condition(s)  0,50 
Restrictive condition A condition that explicitly limits the possibilities of the 
member state and/or uses restrictive language (e.g. 
‘required’) 
0,20 
Two or more restrictive conditions  0,0 
Aim   
                                                             
17 A ‘shall’-deontic sometimes also indicates more discretion (Steunenberg & Toshkov, 2009) 
18 If it refers to national member state law (e.g. ‘in conformity with national law’), I consider this also 
permissive 
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Specified restrictively Definition of aim is confined19 1,00 
Specified extensively Definition of aim is detailed 0,00 
 
The following table, C3, lists a number of examples of (difficult) coding decisions. Similar to the 
coding of customization, I created tables with the provision’s article number, the provision text, the 
deontic, condition and aim coding decisions.  
 
Table C3. Coding examples for discretion 
Article
20 
EU obligation 
(deontic in bold, aims underlined, 
conditions in italics) 
Deontic21 Condition 
 
Aim 
Example from the undertakings directive: 
1a This Directive shall apply to any transfer of 
an undertaking, business, or part 
of an undertaking or business to another 
employer as a result of a legal 
transfer or merger. 
 
Restrictive 
deontic, shall, 
does not offer 
leeway 
D = 0 
2 Restrictive 
conditions 
(restrictive, 
because 
specifies two 
categories) 
C = 0 
Detailed aim 
(categories 
spelled out) 
A = 1 
Example from noise directive: 
7(1) Under no circumstances shall the exposure 
of the worker as determined in accordance 
with Article 3(2) exceed the exposure limit 
values. 
 
D = 0 
[restrictive 
deontic: does 
not allow for 
leeway] 
C = 0,2 
[one 
restrictive 
condition] 
 
A = 0 
[the ‘exposure 
limit values’ 
are specified 
extensively in 
other 
provisions, 
making the 
aim 
restrictive] 
Example from carcinogens directive: 
4(1) The employer shall reduce the use of a 
carcinogen or mutagen at the place of work, 
in particular by replacing it, in 
so far as is technically possible, by a 
substance, preparation or process which, 
under its conditions of use, is not dangerous 
or is less dangerous to workers' health or 
safety, as the case may be. 
D = 0 
[restrictive 
deontic] 
C = 0,5 
[the first is a 
permissive 
condition, 
while the 
second 
condition is 
restrictive] 
A = 0 
                                                             
19 Not extensive (e.g. few to no categories mentioned) and permissive adjectives (e.g. ‘appropriate’, ‘suitable’) 
20 Notation of article numbers: first number refers to the directive’s full article, the second element, either in 
parentheses or not, refers to the sub-article. The third element refers to a sentence or paragraph within the 
sub-article. 
21 The D(eontic)-score will for the largest part also be taken as the ‘open/closed statement’ measure; this is 
possible, because the scoring of the deontic follows the (largely) same rules; in cases where the deontic is 
coded as ‘hybrid’ (i.e. with a permissive and restrictive deontic in one statement), I determined what type of 
statement (open or closed) it is. Where the deontic is scored through averaging multiple sentences, I separately 
scored each sentence as open or closed for calculating the open/closed ratio. The ratio itself was calculated 
using Steunenberg & Toshkov’s 2009 function, see appendix D below. 
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Example from return directive: 
7(1)2 The time period provided for in the first 
subparagraph shall not 
exclude the possibility for the third-country 
nationals concerned to leave earlier. 
 
D = 1 
[although the 
deontic used is 
‘shall’, it is 
permissive, 
rather than 
restrictive] 
C = 1 
[no condition 
used] 
A = 0 
[aim is 
detailed] 
Example from citizen’s rights directive, with more than one sentence in the provision: 
31(3) 3. The redress procedures shall allow for 
an examination of the legality of the 
decision, as well as of the facts and 
circumstances on which the proposed 
measure is based. They shall ensure that 
the decision is not disproportionate, 
particularly in view of the requirements 
laid down in Article 28. 
D = 0 
D = 0 
D = 0 
[both deontics 
are restrictive] 
C = 1 
C = 0,8 
C = 0,9 
[only the 
second 
sentence has a 
condition, and 
this condition 
is permissive, 
as it only 
draws 
attention to a 
particular 
article] 
A = 0 
A = 1 
A = 0,5 
[in the first 
sentence, the 
aim is well-
specified, 
while the aim 
in the second 
sentence 
leaves 
discretion over 
the meaning 
of 
‘disproportion
ate’] 
Example from au pairs directive, with highest degree of discretion: 
20 Member States may require applicants to 
pay fees for the processing of applications. 
D = 1 
[deontic is 
permissive, as it 
leaves option to 
MS] 
C = 1 
[no conditions 
specified] 
Difficult 
A = 1 
[aim is 
specified 
rather broad] 
Example from 2007 payment services directive, with lowest degree of discretion: 
78 Liability under Chapter 2 and 3 shall not 
apply in cases of abnormal and 
unforeseeable circumstances beyond the 
control of the party pleading for the 
application of those circumstances, the 
consequences of which would have been 
unavoidable despite all efforts to the 
contrary, or where a payment service 
provider is bound by other legal obligations 
covered by national or Community 
legislation. 
D = 0 
[deontic does 
not provide 
leeway] 
C = 0 
[two 
conditions, 
both 
restrictive] 
A = 0 
[aim is 
extensively 
specified] 
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Appendix D: operationalization other predictors and controls 
 
Discretion ratio (open/closed) 
Operationalization of discretion ratio, as calculated in Steunenberg and Toshkov (2009) 
Table D1. Number of open and closed statements per directive 
Directive Open Closed 
Undertakings 8 28 
Work equipment 0 17 
Noise 2 73 
Employer insolvency 5 10 
Carcinogens 0 35 
Services 12 65 
Mergers 6 53 
Payment services 2007 59 282 
Payment services 2009 20 62 
Return 15 53 
Mediation 3 26 
Au pairs 13 45 
Citizens’ rights 18 108 
 
From Steunenberg & Toshkov (2009, 959): 
 
“with di as the discretion to member states based on directive i, and Ci as the number of closed and 
Oi as the number of open statements referring to member states in directive i.” 
 
Table D2. Discretion ratio per directive 
Directive Discretion ratio 
Undertakings 0,22 
Work equipment 0,00 
Noise 0,03 
Employer insolvency 0,33 
Carcinogens 0,00 
Services 0,16 
Mergers 0,10 
Payment services 2007 0,17 
Payment services 2009 0,24 
Return 0,22 
Mediation 0,10 
Au pairs 0,22 
Citizens’ rights 0,14 
 
Legal misfit 
Operationalization of legal misfit, as proposed by Steunenberg & Toshkov (2009: 959). The misfit 
score is determined as follows:  
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“We create a categorical variable with four categories – High, Moderate, Limited, and Small misfit. 
High misfit is registered when a directive requires the adoption of many (more than two) legislative 
acts, when these acts are of a higher order (laws and regulations) and when the transposition 
measures are mostly extensive amendments rather than new acts. A moderate degree of misfit is 
observed when many, high order acts are adopted but the acts are new and do not replace existing 
legislation. A limited misfit is present when no more than two transposing acts of second or third 
order (regulations and ordinances) have been adopted and when these acts are amending existing 
norms. If two or fewer transposition acts have been adopted which are new and are not primary 
legislation, we have a small legal misfit.”  
Using these descriptions as guidelines, I scored the degree of legal misfit for each directive (Table E1). 
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Table D3. Coding of legal misfit 
Directive Number of acts and type  
(first order: law/wet 
second-order: regulation/besluit 
third-order: ordinance/ regeling 
Novelty of act 
(new or amending 
existing norms?) 
Misfit score 
(4 = high 
3 = moderate 
2 = limited 
1 = small) 
Notes 
Undertakings 1 (law) Amending 4 Only one transposition act is used, but it is of the highest 
order (a law) and amending existing legislation. For this 
instance, I followed the same coding rationale as described in 
the example of note 6, Steunenberg & Toshkov, 2009: 967. 
 
Work 
equipment 
2 (decree and regulation) Both amending 2 Two transposition acts of a lower order are used, with both 
being amending.  
 
Noise 2 (decrees) Both amending 2 Two transposition acts of a lower order are used, with both 
being amending.  
 
Employer 
insolvency 
1 (law) Amending 4 Although only one transposition act is used, it is of the highest 
order (a law) and (extensively) amending existing legislation. 
For this instance, I followed the same coding rationale as 
described in the example of note 6, Steunenberg & Toshkov, 
2009: 967. 
 
Carcinogens 1 (decree) Amending 2 One, lower-order transposition act which is amending existing 
legislation.  
Services 17 (two laws, five decrees, ten 
regulations)  
One novel law, one 
amending law, two 
amending decrees, 
three novel decrees 
4 Since a large number of transposition acts are used, two of 
which are of the highest order and five second-order, together 
with half of these acts being (extensive) amendments, I 
decided to code this as high misfit. 
 
Mergers 1 (law) Amending 4 Although only one transposition act is used, it is of the highest 
order (a law) and (extensively) amending existing legislation. 
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For this instance, I followed the same coding rationale as 
described in the example of note 6, Steunenberg & Toshkov, 
2009: 967. 
 
Payment 
services 2007 
5 (three decrees, one law and one 
regulation) 
 
One amending law, 
three amending 
decrees, one novel 
regulation 
4 Many transposition acts are used (at least more than two), of 
which four are of high- or middle-order and most are 
amending. I decided to code this as high misfit. 
Payment 
services 2009 
4 (one law, two decrees, one 
regulation) 
 
All are amending   4 With one highest order amending transposition act, and two 
amending lower-order acts, the degree of misfit is high. 
Return 5 (one law, three decrees and one 
regulation)  
The law, one decree 
and the regulation 
are amending 
3 With one highest order amending transposition act, and one 
amending lower-order act, but two novel decrees, the degree 
of misfit is moderate. 
Mediation 1 (law) The law is amending 
existing legislation 
4 Although only one transposition act is used, it is of the highest 
order (a law) and extensively amending existing legislation. 
For this instance, I followed the same coding rationale as 
described in the example of note 6, Steunenberg & Toshkov, 
2009: 967. 
 
Au pairs 2 (decree and regulation) Both amending 2 “A limited misfit is present when no more than two 
transposing acts of second or third order (regulations and 
ordinances) have been adopted and when these acts are 
amending existing norms.” 
Citizens’ rights 3 (one law, two decrees) All amending 4 With one highest order amending transposition act, and two 
amending middle-order acts, the degree of misfit is high. 
 
 
Ministerial preferences 
I follow Zhelyazkova et al. (2017: 835) in their operationalization of ‘ministerial preferences’:  
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“In addition to specific evaluations, conformity studies also provide general information about the transposition process (i.e., the main transposition 
instrument, its date of adoption and the relevant ministries). If the reports did not specifically identify the responsible ministries, we checked the content of 
the main transposition measure and consulted the national databases to obtain that information. The date of the main transposition measure was also used 
to identify other political actors at the time of transposition (e.g., the prime minister). We retrieved the party affiliations of all political actors from the 
European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook. Information about political actors’ positions (regarding common asylum and immigration 
policy, internal market, environmental and employment policy) was obtained from the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (Bakker et al. 2012). If there were multiple 
ministries involved, we took the average of all policy positions.” And: “Although the reports list multiple transposition measures, they explicitly identify the 
‘main’ legal instrument. In exceptional cases, we used the law that transposed most provisions of a directive as the main transposition measure.” 
Rather than relying on the Yearbook to retrieve the party affiliations of the ministers concerned, I will use the public online database of Parlement & 
Politiek22, because I consider this the most reliable database on Dutch politicians.  
Table D4. Coding of ministerial preferences 
Directive Main legal act Ministries 
involved 
Date adoption 
main transposition 
act  
(Dutch cabinet on 
date) 
Ministers (party) CHES position 
(average score) 
[rescaled to 0,10]23 
CHES variable 
Undertakings Wet overgang van 
ondernemingen 
Justice 
Social affairs 
18 April 2002 
(Kok II) 
Korthals24 (VVD) 
Vermeend25 (PvdA) 
3.29 
6.38 
(4.835) 
[6.392] 
EMPLOY 
(position of 
party 
leadership in 
2002 on EU 
employment 
policy)26 
                                                             
22 https://www.parlement.com/;  
23 https://stats.stackexchange.com/questions/25894/changing-the-scale-of-a-variable-to-0-
100?utm_medium=organic&utm_source=google_rich_qa&utm_campaign=google_rich_qa;  
24 https://www.parlement.com/id/vg09llnex2ja/a_h_benk_korthals;  
25 https://www.parlement.com/id/vg09llnzbwu2/w_a_f_g_willem_vermeend;  
26 https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5975c9bfdb29d6a05c65209b/t/599e333df7e0aba9e96015ed/1503540030247/2002_CHES_codebook.pdf;  
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1 = strongly 
opposes 
7 = strongly 
favours 
Work equipment Arbeidsomstandighedenbesluit Social affairs 2009 
(Balkenende IV) 
Donner27 (CDA) 5.78 
[7.966] 
INTMARK 
(position of 
the party 
leadership in 
2006 on the 
internal 
market) 
1 = strongly 
opposes 
7 = strongly 
opposes 
Noise Besluit tot wijziging van het AB 
houdende regels met 
betrekking tot de blootstelling 
van werknemers aan de 
risico’s van lawaai28 
Social affairs 25 January 2006 
(Balkenende II) 
Van Hoof29 (VVD) 6.329 
[8.882] 
INTMARK 
(position of 
the party 
leadership in 
2006 on the 
internal 
market)30 
1 = strongly 
opposes 
7 = strongly 
opposes 
Employer 
insolvency 
Wet van 15 september 2005, 
houdende wijziging van de 
Social affairs 15 September 
2005 
De Geus31 (CDA) 5.78 
[7.966] 
INTMARK 
(position of 
                                                             
27 https://www.parlement.com/id/vg9fgopqa1o0/j_p_h_piet_hein_donner;  
28 https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2006-56.html;  
29 https://www.parlement.com/id/vg09llphrgph/h_a_l_henk_van_hoof;  
30 https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5975c9bfdb29d6a05c65209b/t/599dc1b67131a57e633093f2/1503510970990/2006_CHES_codebook.pdf;  
31 https://www.parlement.com/id/vg9fgoprhbzu/a_j_aart_jan_de_geus;  
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Werkloosheidswet ter 
uitvoering van richtlijn nr. 
2002/74/EG  
(Balkenende II) the party 
leadership in 
2006 on the 
internal 
market) 
1 = strongly 
opposes 
7 = strongly 
opposes 
Carcinogens Besluit tot wijziging van het AB 
houdende regels inzake 
chemische en carcinogene 
agentia, Staatsblad nr 190 van 
200232 
Social affairs 29 March 2002 
(Kok II) 
Hoogervorst33(VVD) 3.29 
[3.816] 
EMPLOY 
(position of 
party 
leadership in 
2002 on EU 
employment 
policy) 
1 = strongly 
opposes 
7 = strongly 
favours 
Services Dienstenwet34 Economic Affairs 
Interior  
Justice 
4 December 2009 
(Balkenende IV) 
Van der Hoeven 
(CDA)35 
Ter Horst (PvdA)36 
Hirsch Ballin 
(CDA)37 
5.78 
 
5 
5.78 
(5.52) 
[7.533] 
INTMARK 
(position of 
the party 
leadership in 
2006 on the 
                                                             
32 https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2002-190.html;  
33 https://www.parlement.com/id/vg09lllc9opo/j_f_hans_hoogervorst;  
34 http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0026759/2015-01-01;  
35 https://www.parlement.com/id/vg09llpdhhzz/m_j_a_maria_van_der_hoeven;  
36 https://www.parlement.com/id/vhia2qep40ni/g_guusje_ter_horst;  
37 https://www.parlement.com/id/vg09llqdn6x0/e_m_h_ernst_hirsch_ballin;  
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internal 
market)38 
1 = strongly 
opposes 
7 = strongly 
opposes 
Mergers Wet van 27 juni 2008 
houdende wijziging van boek 2 
van het Burgerlijk Wetboek in 
verband met de implementatie 
van richtlijn nr. 2005/56/EG 
van het Europees Parlement 
en de Raad van de Europese 
Unie betreffende 
grensoverschrijdende fusies 
van kapitaalvennootschappen 
 
Justice 27 June 2008 
(Balkenende IV) 
Hirsch Ballin (CDA) 5.78 
[7.966] 
INTMARK 
(position of 
the party 
leadership in 
2006 on the 
internal 
market) 
1 = strongly 
opposes 
7 = strongly 
opposes 
Payment services 
2007 
Wet van 15 oktober 2009 tot 
wijziging van de Wet op het 
financieel toezicht, het 
Burgerlijk Wetboek en de Wet 
inzake geldtransactiekantoren 
en intrekking van de Wet op 
het grensoverschrijdend 
betalingsverkeer ter 
implementatie van richtlijn nr. 
2007/64/EG van het Europees 
Parlement en de Raad 
betreffende betalingsdiensten 
Finance 
Justice 
15 October 2009 
(Balkenende IV) 
Bos (PvdA)40 
Hirsch Ballin (CDA) 
5 
5.78 
(5.39) 
[7,316] 
INTMARK 
(position of 
the party 
leadership in 
2006 on the 
internal 
market) 
1 = strongly 
opposes 
7 = strongly 
opposes 
                                                             
38 The next CHES survey was conducted only in spring of 2011, which, given the change of two cabinets since 2010 before this moment, is more distant politically than the 
2006 survey, which is more likely to contain similar issue positions of parties for those in 2009, because the cabinet was the same 
40 https://www.parlement.com/id/vg09lljtu4za/w_j_wouter_bos;  
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in de interne markt en tot 
wijziging van de Richtlijnen 
97/7/EG, 2002/65/EG, 
2005/60/EG en 2006/48/EG, 
en tot intrekking van Richtlijn 
97/5/EG (PbEU L 319)39 
 
Payment services 
2009 
Wet van 22 december 2011 tot 
wijziging van de Wet op het 
financieel toezicht en enige 
andere wetten ter 
implementatie van richtlijn nr. 
2009/110/EG van het 
Europees Parlement en de 
Raad betreffende de toegang 
tot, de uitoefening van en het 
prudentieel toezicht op de 
werkzaamheden van 
instellingen voor elektronisch 
geld, tot wijziging van de 
Richtlijnen 2005/60/EG en 
2006/48/EG en tot intrekking 
van Richtlijn 2000/46/EG 
(PbEU L 267)41 
Finance 
Justice 
22 December 2011 
(Rutte I) 
De Jager (CDA)42 
Opstelten (VVD)43 
5.818 
6.538 
(6,178) 
[8,630] 
EU_INTMARK 
(position of 
the party 
leadership in 
2011 on the 
internal 
market)44 
1 = strongly 
Opposes 
7 = strongly 
favours 
Return Wet van 15 december 2011 tot 
wijziging van de 
Vreemdelingenwet 2000 ter 
Immigration 15 December 2011 
(Rutte I) 
Leers (CDA)46 7.000 IMMIGRATE_ 
POLICY 
                                                             
39 https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2009-436.html;  
41 https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2011-670.html;  
42 https://www.parlement.com/id/vhia2qep44vn/j_c_jan_kees_de_jager;  
43 https://www.parlement.com/id/vg09lm0ci8xr/i_w_ivo_opstelten;  
44 https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5975c9bfdb29d6a05c65209b/t/599dbe268419c24160addd96/1503510056004/2010_CHES_codebook.pdf;  
46 https://www.parlement.com/id/vg09llpegh1s/g_b_m_gerd_leers;  
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implementatie van de richtlijn 
nr. 2008/115/EG van het 
Europees Parlement en de 
Raad van 16 december 2008 
over gemeenschappelijke 
normen en procedures in de 
lidstaten voor de terugkeer 
van onderdanen van derde 
landen die illegaal op hun 
grondgebied verblijven (PbEU 
L 348/98) 45 
 
(2011 position 
on 
immigration 
policy) 
0 = strongly 
opposes tough 
policy 
10 = strongly 
favours tough 
policy 
Mediation Law of 15 November 2012 
implementing Directive nr. 
2008/52/EC on certain aspects 
of mediation in civil and 
commercial matters (Wet van 
15 november 2012 tot 
implementatie van de richtlijn 
nr. 2008/52/EG betreffende 
bepaalde aspecten van 
bemiddeling/mediation in 
burgerlijke en handelszaken 
abbreviated by the legislator 
as Wet implementatie richtlijn 
nr. 2008/52/EG betreffende 
bepaalde aspecten van 
bemiddeling/mediation in 
burgerlijke en handelszaken).47 
 
Justice 15 November 2012 
(Rutte II) 
Opstelten (VVD) 8.454 IMMIGRATE_ 
POLICY 
(2011 position 
on 
immigration 
policy) 
0 = strongly 
opposes tough 
policy 
10 = strongly 
favours tough 
policy 
                                                             
45 https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2011-663.html;  
47 http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0032232/2017-09-01;  
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Au pairs Besluit van 2 oktober 2006 tot 
wijziging van het 
Vreemdelingenbesluit 2000 ter 
implementatie van de richtlijn 
2004/114/EG van de Raad van 
13 december 2004 
betreffende de voorwaarden 
voor de toelating van 
onderdanen van derde landen 
met het oog op studie, 
scholierenuitwisseling, 
onbezoldigde opleiding of 
vrijwilligerswerk (PbEU L 375)48 
 
Integration 2 October 2006 
(Balkenende III) 
Verdonk (VVD)49 8 IMMIG (2006 
position on 
immigration 
policy)50 
0 = strongly 
opposes tough 
policy 
10 = strongly 
favours tough 
policy 
Citizens’ rights Wet van 7 juli 2006 tot 
wijziging van de Wet werk en 
bijstand, van de Wet 
studifinanciering 2000, van de 
Wet tegemoetkoming 
onderwijsbijdrage en 
schoolkosten en van de 
Vreemdelingenwet 2000 in 
verband met de 
totstandkoming van richtlijn 
2004/38/EG betreffende het 
recht van vrij verkeer en 
Social affairs  
Education 
Integration 
Foreign Affairs 
7 July 2006 
(Balkenende II) 
Van Hoof (VVD)52 
Bruins (VVD)53 
Donner (CDA)54 
Bot (CDA)55 
8.17 
8.17 
7 
 
7 
(7.585) 
IMMIG (2006 
position on 
immigration 
policy) 
0 = strongly 
opposes tough 
policy 
10 = strongly 
favours tough 
policy 
                                                             
48 https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2006-458.html;  
49 https://www.parlement.com/id/vggf1fmjymy3/m_c_f_rita_verdonk;  
50 Unfortunately, no question in the CHES 2006 was asked on the party position on immigration policy at the EU-level 
52 https://www.parlement.com/id/vg09llphrgph/h_a_l_henk_van_hoof;  
53 https://www.parlement.com/id/vhbo1bl3p8u8/b_j_bruno_bruins;  
54 https://www.parlement.com/id/vg9fgopqa1o0/j_p_h_piet_hein_donner;  
55 https://www.parlement.com/id/vg09llzsaexi/b_r_bernhard_bot;  
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verblijf op het grondgebied 
van de lidstaten voor de 
burgers van de Unie en hun 
familieleden, alsmede 
goedkeuring van een daarmee 
samenhangend voorbehoud bij 
het Europees Verdrag inzake 
sociale en medische bijstand51 
 
Number of veto players 
In operationalizing the number of veto players, I will create a ‘procedural veto player index’, in line with Steunenberg and Rhinard (2010: 503), “(…) which 
takes account of the fact that the number of veto players involved depends on the procedure that is used.”  
And: “This index was constructed based on the knowledge that the general/parliamentary legislative process involves the highest possible number of 
administrative and political veto players: in addition to parliamentary actors, the bill must also be approved by the government (or cabinet), along with the 
ministries involved in the preparatory process. […] The decision-making processes within ministries and cabinets work differently. Transposition in these cases 
relies upon the making of ministerial orders, a process that does not involve the entire government and thus other members of the governing coalition. […] 
Our new index uses insights related to the actual stages of national transposition and we construct it as follows. If transposition is handled at the ministerial 
level, by adopting a ministerial order or similar instrument, the number of ministries involved is counted. If transposition is decided at cabinet level, by 
adopting a government decree or similar instrument, a score based on the autonomy of the prime minister is added to the index. This score is based on the 
analysis by Bergman et al. (2003) of cabinet governments in Western Europe […] and takes account of various aspects of the prime minister’s position in 
government. The original measurement is rescaled to the [0,1] interval. A very powerful prime minister, who dominates the decision-making in the cabinet, 
has a value of one, while a weak prime minister, unable to exercise power over his or her ministers, has a value close to zero. Finally, if transposition requires 
the passing of a bill, the national legislative veto player index, as proposed by Tsebelis (2005), is added.”  
Because the data in Tsebelis’ legislative veto player index is only available until 2000, I use the Political Constraint Index56 of Henisz (2017) instead. This 
index builds on Tsebelis’s index and seeks to measure the degree of ‘political constraints’ by incorporating the number of institutional veto players while 
                                                             
51 https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2006-
373.html?zoekcriteria=%3Fzkt%3DUitgebreid%26pst%3DStaatsblad%26vrt%3D360%26zkd%3DInDeGeheleText%26dpr%3DAlle%26sdt%3DDatumUitgifte%26pnr%3D29%26
rpp%3D10%26_page%3D25%26sorttype%3D1%26sortorder%3D4&resultIndex=245&sorttype=1&sortorder=4;  
56 https://mgmt.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/heniszpolcon/polcondataset/;  
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“taking into account the extent of alignment across branches of government using data on the party composition of the executive and legislative branches” 
(Henisz, 2002). Given that Henisz (2002) finds that the results of his analysis using the political constraint index echo those of Tsebelis, I deem this an 
adequate alternative. To be specific, I use the POLCONiii-version of the index, which does not include judicial and lower governmental veto players.   
Although the data of Bergman et al. (2003; 190) is also only collected until 2000, one of the two determinants of the scores is likely to be the same for the 
years concerning the directives in this analysis: the Dutch prime minister’s institutional powers have not changed (Andeweg & Irwin, 2014). The other 
determinant, party system cohesion, is scored by applying Bergman et al.’s coding scheme for the cabinets of concern. Subsequently, the scores are 
aggregated and rescaled to a scale of [0,1] (the original maximum score possible was 30).  
For identifying the transposition process, I take the main transposition measure (as indicated by the EPL) as reference. 
Table D5. Number of veto players 
Directive Type of 
transposition 
Date adoption main 
transposition act  
(Dutch cabinet on 
date) 
Type of cabinet and score 
using Bergman et al.’s coding 
directions 
(data on cabinet type from 
Andeweg & Irwin, 2014) 
Political 
constraint index 
(ranges between 
0 – 1) 
Number of 
ministers 
Prime minister 
[rescaled to 
0,1] 
Total score 
Undertakings Law 18 April 2002 
(Kok II) 
Oversized (pivotal party 
coalition) 
7/15 
0,640763287 2 11/30 
[0,366] 
3,007 
Work equipment Decree 2009 
(Balkenende IV) 
Minimal winning 
5/15 
Not relevant 1 9 
[0,300] 
1,300 
Noise Decree 25 January 2006 
(Balkenende II) 
Minimal winning 
5/15 
Not relevant 1 9 
[0,300] 
1,300 
Employer 
insolvency 
Law 15 September 2005 
(Balkenende II) 
Minimal winning 
5/15 
0,638393131 1 9 
[0,300] 
1,938 
Carcinogens Decree 29 March 2002 
(Kok II) 
Oversized 
7/15 
Not relevant 1 11 
[0,366] 
1,366 
Services Law 4 December 2009 
(Balkenende IV) 
Minimal winning 
5/15 
0,661950541 3 9 
[0,300] 
3,962 
Mergers Law 27 June 2008 
(Balkenende IV) 
Minimal winning 
5/15 
0,661950541 1 9 
[0,300] 
1,962 
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Payment services 
2007 
Law 15 October 2009 
(Balkenende IV) 
Minimal winning 
5/15 
0,661950541 2 9 
[0,300] 
2,962 
Payment services 
2009 
Law 22 December 2011 
(Rutte I) 
Minority 
3/15 
0,411015902 2 7 
[0,233] 
2,644 
Return Law 15 December 2011 
(Rutte I) 
Minority 
3/15 
0,411015902 1 7 
[0,233] 
1,644 
Mediation Law 15 November 2012 
(Rutte II) 
Majority 
5/15 
0,691087974 1 9 
[0,300] 
1,991 
Au pairs Decree 2 October 2006 
(Balkenende III) 
Minority 
3/15 
Not relevant 1 7 
[0,233] 
1,233 
Citizens’ rights Law 7 July 2006 
(Balkenende II) 
Minimal winning 
5/15 
0,650312594 4 9 
[0,233] 
4,883 
 
Administrative capacity 
Although determining the relative capacity of different sectors in one member state is challenging (Dimitrova & Steunenberg, 2016), I decided to 
operationalize capacity here as the performance of a sector as evaluated by its top-tier managers in the COCOPS survey of 2013 (Jilke et al.). This 
performance is evaluated according to a range of indicators (e.g. ‘policy effectiveness’ and ‘service quality’) for the question how the respondents think their 
policy area has performed over the last 5 years. I calculate the average score for all respondents per ministry in the survey.  
As measure for ‘administrative capacity’, I am using the answers to the question “Thinking about your policy area over the last five years, how would you 
rate the way public administration has performed on the following dimensions?” (Jilke et al., 2013: 28). The dimensions range from ‘citizen trust in 
government’ to ‘cost and efficiency’, but I will only take the average score for each policy sector respondent score on the dimensions ‘policy coherence and 
coordination’ and ‘policy effectiveness’. Unfortunately, there is very little variation in the scores, which leaves little relevance to include it in the final 
analysis, particularly in light of the multilevel data structure.  
Table D6. Coding administrative capacity 
Directive Ministries 
involved 
Policy area in cocops N Policy 
effectiveness 
Policy 
coherence 
Weighted average  
Undertakings Justice 
Social affairs 
Justice 
Employment 
77 
98 
4,58 
4,60 
4,58 
4,61 
4,59 
Work equipment Social affairs Employment 98 4,60 4,61 4,61 
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Noise Social affairs Employment 98 4,60 4,61 4,61 
Employer insolvency Social affairs Employment 
Other social protection 
98 
85 
4,60 
4,61 
4,61 
4,61 
4,61 
Carcinogens Social affairs Employment 98 4,60 4,61 4,61 
Services Economic  
Interior  
Justice 
Economic 
General government 
Justice 
90 
76 
77 
4,56 
4,62 
4,58 
4,59 
4,62 
4,58 
4,59 
Mergers Justice Justice 77 4,58 4,58 4,58 
Payment services 
2007 
Finance 
Justice 
Finance 
Justice 
84 
77 
4,56 
4,58 
4,58 
4,58 
4,57 
Payment services 
2009 
Finance 
Justice 
Finance 
Justice 
84 
77 
4,56 
4,58 
4,58 
4,58 
4,57 
Return Immigration Justice 77 4,58 4,58 4,58 
Mediation Justice Justice 77 4,58 4,58 4,58 
Au pairs Integration Justice 77 4,58 4,58 4,58 
Citizens’ rights Social affairs  
Education 
Integration 
Foreign Affairs 
Employment  
Education 
Justice 
Foreign Affairs 
98 
85 
77 
95 
4,60 
4,61 
4,58 
4,58 
4,61 
4,61 
4,58 
4,58 
4,59 
 
Public EU support 
To determine the score for public EU support, I use Eurobarometer survey data. In these surveys I looked for questions that concern – in one way or another 
(but as closely as possible) – whether the central policy issue of the directive should be under the competences of the EU and evaluate the EU’s 
performance in this regard. 
Table D7. Coding public EU support 
Directive Date adoption main 
transposition act  
(Dutch cabinet on date) 
Eurobarometer source and question Average 
score 
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Undertakings 18 April 2002 
(Kok II) 
EB 60.2 (2003) Q7: In general, would you say that what you see, read or hear 
about what the European Union does in the area of employment and social affairs 
is very positive, fairly positive, fairly negative or very negative? 
2,41/4 
(1 = very 
positive) 
Work equipment 2009 
(Balkenende IV) 
EB 71.2 (2009) Q20.1: Please tell me to what extent you think the European Union 
has a positive or negative impact on each of the following employment and social 
policies: Setting minimum standards for working conditions throughout the EU 
2,09/4 
(1 = very 
positive) 
Noise 25 January 2006 
(Balkenende II) 
EB 65.3 (2006) Q20.1: Please tell me to what extent you think the European Union 
has a positive or negative impact on each of the following employment and social 
policies: Setting minimum standards for working conditions throughout the EU 
1,97/4 
(1 = very 
positive) 
Employer insolvency 15 September 2005 
(Balkenende II) 
EB 65.3 (2006) Q20.2: Please tell me to what extent you think the European Union 
has a positive or negative impact on each of the following employment and social 
policies: Creating new job opportunities and fighting unemployment 
1,76/4 
(1 = very 
positive) 
Carcinogens 29 March 2002 
(Kok II) 
EB 60.2 (2003) Q7: In general, would you say that what you see, read or hear 
about what the European Union does in the area of employment and social affairs 
is very positive, fairly positive, fairly negative or very negative? 
2,41/4 
(1 = very 
positive) 
Services 4 December 2009 
(Balkenende IV) 
EB 65.1 (2006) Q3.1-3: In your opinion, would you say that, for consumers, the 
Single Market has been very positive, fairly positive, fairly negative or very 
negative in respect of…? 1) The range of products and services 2) The prices of 
products and services 3) The quality of products and services 
2,49/457 
(1 = very 
positive) 
Mergers 27 June 2008 
(Balkenende IV) 
FEB 263 (2009) Q21_D: Could you say for the following statements if you would 
completely agree, agree, disagree or completely disagree: The Internal Market in 
the EU ensures that there is fair competition between companies 
0,92/458 
(1 = 
completely 
agree) 
Payment services 2007 15 October 2009 
(Balkenende IV) 
FEB 263 (2009) Q21_D: Could you say for the following statements if you would 
completely agree, agree, disagree or completely disagree: The Internal Market in 
the EU ensures that there is fair competition between companies 
0,92/4  
(1 = 
completely 
agree) 
Payment services 2009 22 December 2011 
(Rutte I) 
EB 75.1 (2011) QD9_8: If you have done one of the following, how easy or difficult 
was it? Opening a bank account in another EU country 
1,9559/4 
                                                             
57 I calculated the average over these three mean scores (2,15; 2,70; 2,61) 
58 I reversed the score because the scale is in the opposite direction from the other questions (1 = completely disagree), the original being 3,08 
59 I reversed the score because the scale is in the opposite direction from the other questions (1 = very easy), the original being 2,05 
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(1 = very 
difficult) 
Return 15 December 2011 
(Rutte I) 
EB 76.4 (2011) QB7_2: Asylum is granted to people who, out of fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality or other, are outside their 
country of origin and are in need of international protection. To what extent do 
you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? Across the EU the 
rules for admitting asylum seekers should be the same 
1,44/4 
(1 = totally 
agree) 
Mediation 15 November 2012 
(Rutte II) 
FEB 385 (2013) Q8: Imagine you are seeking a solution to a dispute with a 
company, another citizen or an administration. If you could use an alternative 
instead of going to court, would you prefer to… 1) go to court anyway 2) find an 
agreement with the other party directly 3) find an agreement with the other party 
with the help of a non-judicial body that has a mediation role 
0,93/460 
(1 = 
mediation) 
 
Au pairs 2 October 2006 
(Balkenende III) 
EB 65.4 (2006) QD1_1: For each of the following, please tell me if you believe that 
more or less decision-making should take place at a European level: Asylum and 
migration policy 
1,63/461 
(1 = more 
at EU 
level) 
Citizens’ rights 7 July 2006 
(Balkenende II) 
EB 65.4 (2006) QD1_1: For each of the following, please tell me if you believe that 
more or less decision-making should take place at a European level: Asylum and 
migration policy 
1,63/4  
(1 = more 
at EU 
level) 
 
Commission monitoring 
I follow two possible ways to operationalize this variable. In the first, I take the number of letters of formal notice issued directly to the directive as measure, 
obtaining the date from the CeLex-database. To ensure that the data is reliable, I also checked the EPLs on information in this regard. For the second 
operationalization I also rely on this data, but then take the number of letters of formal notice for issued in the year of transposing the ‘main’ transposition 
act as indication of perception of EC monitoring.   
                                                             
60 I rescaled the score to a scale of 4, as the other items also use a four-point scale, the original being 2,38. The rescaled score is 3,07, after which I reversed the scale, 
because the scale is in the opposite direction from the other question (3 = mediation). 
61 I rescaled the score to a scale of 4, as the other items also use a four-point scale, the original being 1,21 (/2). 
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Table D8. Coding EC monitoring 
Directive Date adoption main 
transposition act  
 
Infringements mentioned in database62 
(FN = letter of formal notice; 
 RO = reasoned opinion; 
 IF = Infringement referral)  
(infringement number in brackets) 
Number of infringements in 
policy area63 in year of main 
transposition646566 
Undertakings 18 April 2002 0 2 FN 
Work equipment 2009 0 2 FN, 3 RO, 2 IF  
Noise 25 January 2006 0 0 
Employer insolvency 15 September 2005 1 FN (20074066) 0 
Carcinogens 29 March 2002 0 2 FN 
Services 4 December 2009 0 8 FN, 3 RO 
Mergers 27 June 2008 2 FN, 2 RO, 1 IF (20080179, 20084746) 11 FN, 9 RO, 2 IF 
Payment services 2007 15 October 2009 0 8 FN, 3 RO 
Payment services 2009 22 December 2011 1 FN (20110621) 9 FN, 1 RO 
Return 15 December 2011 1 FN, RO (20110285) 2 FN, 2 RO, 1 IF 
Mediation 15 November 2012 1 FN, RO, IF (20110896) 2 FN, 1 RO 
Au pairs 2 October 2006 0 4 FN, 1 RO  
Citizens’ rights 7 July 2006 0 4 FN, 1 RO 
 
Interest group diversity/Corporatism 
                                                             
62 http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/applying-eu-law/infringements-
proceedings/infringement_decisions/index.cfm?lang_code=EN&typeOfSearch=true&active_only=0&noncom=0&r_dossier=&decision_date_from=&decision_date_to=&EM
=NL&title=2008%2F115&submit=Search; 
63 The DG responsible for the directive 
64 Because the ‘main transposition date’ refers to the date on which the transposition act was adopted, the further administrative process of transposition takes place after 
this date.   
65 When a case is being closed in the year of concern, and the reasoned opinion is not issued in that same year, it is not taken into account  
66 When the title of the infringement case explicitly refers to lower-levels of government (e.g. ‘municipality of …’), I did not take it into account 
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Although I managed to obtain the interest group diversity data from Kaya (2017), the data only covers internal market directives. Because the open 
consultations on which the coding of the data is based, are not available for social and JHA directives (Kaya, 2017: 8), I had to find an alternative 
operationalization. Zhelyazkova and Schrama (2018) use the ‘civil-society organization consultation score’ (from V-dem) together with the civil participation 
score (Eurobarometer survey items), but the data for these variables hardly varies over time (for example, the Eurobarometer survey scores are extracted 
from three survey items only for all years). As an alternative, I use Jahn’s corporatism index (2016). This index does not measure the diversity in interest 
groups, but it does broadly measure the change in corporatist arrangements over time (in terms of scope, function and structure of corporatism). Because 
Jahn’s original data is only available until 2010, I incorporated data from the updated dataset by Visser (2018), which builds on Jahn’s original index67. In the 
table below, I included data of all three operationalizations I just discussed.68   
Table D9. Coding corporatism 
Directive Kaya diversity score Date adoption 
main 
transposition act  
 
CSO consultation 
score 
(Zhelyazkova & 
Schrama, 2018) 
Civil 
participation 
score 
(62.2; 66.3; 
76.2) 
Corporatism Jahn 
(including updated 
Visser data for 2011 
and 2012) = data used 
in my analysis 
Undertakings 
(2001/23/EC) 
 18 April 2002 2,12  1,11612713336945 
Work equipment 
(2009/104/EC) 
 2009 2,12  1,00842714309692 
Noise (2003/10/EC)  25 January 2006 2,12  0,846936285495758 
Employer insolvency 
(2002/74/EC) 
 15 September 
2005 
2,12  0,949768900871277 
Carcinogens 
(2004/37/EC) 
 29 March 2002 2,12  1,11612713336945 
Services 
(2006/123/EC) 
0.0526000000536442 4 December 
2009 
2,12  1,00842714309692 
Mergers 
(2005/56/EC) 
0.624028563499451 27 June 2008 2,12  0,581182062625885 
                                                             
67 Both available at http://comparativepolitics.uni-greifswald.de/download.php;  
68 As an alternative, I could incorporate other civil participation data, and thereby pursue a similar operationalization as Zhelyazkova & Schrama (2018), but this would lead 
to little variation and is not necessarily a more valid measure. 
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Payment services 
(2007/64/EC) 
0.497044444084167 15 October 2009 2,12  1,00842714309692 
Payment services 
(2009/110/EC) 
0.427599996328354 22 December 
2011 
2,12  0,584294021129608 
Return 
(2008/115/EC) 
 15 December 
2011 
2,12  0,584294021129608 
Mediation 
(2008/52/EC) 
 15 November 
2012 
3,32  0,571490005183239 
Au pairs 
(2004/114/EC) 
 2 October 2006 2,12  0,846936285495758 
Citizens’ rights 
(2004/38/EC) 
 7 July 2006 2,12  0,846936285495758 
 
Sectoral interventionist style 
I tried to operationalize this control variable following the directions put forward by Thomann69 (2015). However, they are rather general, leaving unclear 
what kind of data is used to derive the interventionist style. By ‘regulatory instruments’, does this refer to actual policy instruments (i.e. practical 
implementation), or to the particular legal instruments used? In the description she seems ambiguous: “The countries’ sectoral interventionist styles are 
expressed through the average degree of coerciveness of, i.e., the relative prevalence of sermons, carrots and sticks in, the transposing domestic veterinary 
drugs regulations” (2015:1374). It is not clear to me what is meant by ‘the transposing regulations’. The literature on which she, in turn, relies (Sager, 2009) 
uses information on the practical implementation of legislation. Should it concern this, I would not be able to control for this, as I do not have sufficient 
information available on the practical implementation stage for all directives. Therefore, I have not been able to control for this yet, although I do not expect 
it to change the results considerably.
                                                             
69 She is the first (and only one it seems) to have used this variable in the context of transposition research. For this reason, I am dependent to a large extent on her 
operationalization, as well as the few relevant previous studies (Sager, 2009; Sager et al., 2011), to look for possible guidance on the operationalization of this variable.  
62 
 
Appendix E: tables and figures 
Table E1. Descriptive statistics 
 N Mean SD Min. Max. Scale 
Directive number 
(grouping variable) 
1,072 8.10 3.11 1 13  
Policy area 
(grouping variable) 
1,072 2.11 0.67 1 3  
Density 
 
1,072 -0.04 0.58 -1 1 -1 = Less density 
Restrictiveness 
 
1,072 -0.03 0.55 -1 1 -1 = Less restrictiveness 
Customization 
(aggregated) 
 
1,072 -0.07 0.97 -2 2 -2 = Less density and 
restrictiveness 
Customization (amount) 1,072 0.64 0.87 0 2 2 = customization on 
both dimensions 
Discretion (ratio) 
 
1,072 0.16 0.07 0.00 0.33 0 = closed statement 
Discretion (IGT) 
 
1,072 1.03 0.83 0.00 3.50 0 = no discretion 
Number of veto players 
 
1,072 2.76 1.11 1.23 4.88 0 = no veto players 
Ministerial preferences 
 
1,072 7.54 0.90 3.82 8.88 0 = strongly supports 
line of directive 
Corporatism 
 
1,072 0.87 0.18 0.57 1.12 0 = no corporatist 
arrangements 
 
Public EU policy support 
 
1,072 1.49 0.56 0.92 2.49 0 = more support 
EC monitoring (directive 
letters) 
1,072 0.31 0.57 0 2 0 = no formal letter 
sent concerning 
directive 
EC monitoring (area 
letters) 
 
1,072 5.71 3.25 0 11 0 = no formal letter 
sent in policy area 
Administrative capacity 
 
1,072 4.58 0.01 4.57 4.61 0 = no capacity 
Number of ministers 
 
1,072 1.97 0.96 1 4 0 = no minister 
involved 
Complexity 
 
1,072 43.46 28.23 10 118 0 = no recitals 
Misfit 
 
1,072 3.58 0.77 2 4 0 = no misfit 
Employment (dummy) 
 
1,072 0.17 0.38 0 1 1 = employment  
Internal market 
(dummy) 
 
1,072 0.54 0.50 0 1 1 = internal market 
JHA (dummy) 1,072 0.28 0.45 0 1 1 = JHA 
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Table E2. Distribution of cases across policy areas and directives 
EU directive N  
Employment and social policy 186 
2001/23/EC (undertakings) 38 
2009/104/EC (work equipment) 17 
2003/10/EC (noise) 75 
2002/74/EC (insolvency) 21 
2004/37/EC (carcinogens) 35 
Internal market and services 584 
2006/123/EC (services) 76 
2005/56/EC (mergers) 62 
2007/64/EC (payment) 362 
2009/110/EC (payment) 84 
Justice and home affairs 302 
2008/115/EC (return) 75 
2008/52/EC (mediation) 29 
2004/114/EC (au pairs) 63 
2004/38/EC (citizen rights) 135 
Total 1,072 
 
Figure E1. Histograms of distribution of customization and discretion 
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Table E3. Predicting amount of customization, with discretion ratio (model 1) and discretion IGT 
(model 2): odds ratios 
 Model 1 
Discretion (ratio) 
Model 2 
Discretion (IGT) 
 95% CI for odds ratio 95% CI for odds ratio 
Level-1 (Provision) Lower OR Higher Lower OR higher 
(Intercept) 0.46   0.59* 0.75 0.33 0.43 0.56 
Discretion (IGT)    1.16   1.36* 1.58 
Level-2 (Directive)       
Discretion (ratio) 0.00 0.06 6.80    
Ministerial 
preferences 
0.43 0.69 1.11 0.41  0.67 1.09 
Number of veto 
players 
0.78 1.12 1.60 1.02   1.36* 1.80 
Public EU support 1.32   1.97* 2.92 1.23   1.65* 2.20 
Corporatism 0.04 0.50 6.19 0.05 0.64 7.96 
EC monitoring 
(directive) 
0.82 1.71 3.59 1.18 2.31 4.52 
Misfit 0.56 1.31 3.07 0.47 0.88 1.64 
Directive complexity 
 
1.00 0.99 1.01 1.00 0.99 1.01 
Variance: Intercepts 0.05   0.03   
Variance: random 
slope misfit*dir. 
0.28   0.17   
N (observations) 1,072   1,072   
N (directives) 13   13   
Notes: Binomial logistic regression; models with random intercepts and random slope for legal misfit 
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Appendix F: Robustness check: exclusion of 2007 payment services directive (so far only 
for amount of customization) 
Figure F1. Histograms of amount (left) and direction (right) of customization, excluding 2007 
payment services directive 
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Table F1. Predicting amount of customization (excluding PS 2007 directive), with discretion ratio (model 1) and discretion IGT (model 2): odds ratios 
 Model 1 
Discretion (ratio) 
(random intercepts only) 
Model 2 
Discretion (IGT) 
(random intercepts & 1 random slope on n_vp) 
 95% CI for odds ratio 
 
% change in 
odds 
95% CI for odds ratio % change in odds 
Level-1 (Provision) Lower OR Higher  Lower OR higher  
Threshold 0|1 0.92 1.05 1.20  1.08  1.32* 1.62  
Threshold 1|2 6.79 7.90* 9.19  0.96 1.18 1.44  
Discretion (IGT)     0.77 0.86* 0.97 32.06 
Level-2 (Directive)         
Discretion (ratio) 0.29 1.96 13.30 690.01     
Ministerial preferences 0.56 0.65* 0.76 -20.84 0.80 0.93 1.07 -13.52 
Number of veto players 0.58 0.79 1.08 5.46 1.49 2.13* 3.05 17.71 
Public EU support 0.60 1.00 1.67 -34.87 0.66 1.00 1.51 -7.42 
Corporatism 0.26 1.20 5.49 95.99 0.39 1.45 5.33 113.36 
EC monitoring (directive) 0.53 1.04 2.00 19.98 0.54 0.93 1.60 44.77 
Misfit 4.77 7.90* 13.09 3.51 0.77 1.18 1.79 -7.43 
Directive complexity 
 
1.05 1.05* 1.06 0.31 1.31 1.32* 1.33 -0.09 
Variance: Intercepts 0.10    0.00    
Variance: n_vp     0.02    
Deviance         
N (observations) 710    710    
N (directives) 12    12    
Notes: CLMM ordered logistic regression; p-values based on 95% confidence intervals; *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001;
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Table F2. Effect of predictors and controls on amount of customization (excluding 2007 PS directive)  
 Model 
(random intercepts, 
No random slope) 
CI 99% 
Level-1 (Provision) 
 
  
(Intercept) 
 
  0.94 
              (1.17) 
 -0.83; 2.74 
Discretion (IGT) 
 
        0.18*** 
              (0.04) 
 0.08; 0.29 
Level-2 (Directive) 
 
  
Ministerial preferences              -0.09 
(0.08) 
-0.22; 0.03 
Number of veto players 0.09 
(0.18) 
-0.20; 0.34 
Public EU support              -0.08 
(0.31) 
-0.55; 0.36 
Corporatism 0.43 
(0.91) 
-0.91; 1.78 
EC monitoring (directive) 
 
0.20 
(0.37) 
-0.37; 0.75 
Misfit 
 
             -0.07 
(0.25) 
-0.42; 0.36 
Directive complexity               0.00 
(0.00) 
 0.00; 0.01 
AIC 1875.75  
BIC 1925.96  
-2LL 1853.75  
N 710  
N groups 12  
Variance country (intercept) 0.06  
Variance residual 0.76  
Notes: MLM OLS regression; p-values based on 99% confidence intervals; *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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